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Summary
In this thesis I present three essays that explore various economic situations on
strategic choices from different perspectives: the individuals’ strategic decision to
work on the informal/formal sector, the US strategic decision on the provision of
foreign aid, and the firm’s strategic decision to engage in Corporate Social Respon-
sibility (CSR).
The first essay presents an analysis on the effect of income taxes and its effect
on worker’s transitions towards informality. We find that an increase in average tax
rate leads to a statistically significant increase in transitions towards informality
for women and those with low incomes.
The second essay offers evidence of how patterns of US foreign aid to Latin
America differ from aid allocation observed elsewhere. We find that while political
institutions and events in recipient countries greatly influence US aid allocations,
the ideological orientation of US administrations can explain part of the divergent
patters of aid towards Latin America.
Finally, the third essay studies two possible mechanisms that affect the deci-
sion of a firm to engage in CSR: the role of growth in value added and workers’
preferences. The results suggest that firms engage in CSR in times of economic
prosperity; peer effects are increasingly important in a firm’s decision to engage in
CSR when the proportion of firms within an industry increases. And finally, I find
a weak link between workers’ preferences and a firm’s decision to engage in CSR
activities related with diversity.
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Chapter 1
Informality and Taxes in Mexico
Abstract
A large literature has argued that taxes on formal sector labor encourage high rates
of informal employment in developing and emerging countries. Despite this, there
are few estimates of the strength of this channel, and how it varies across segments
of the population. This paper seeks to fill that gap by exploiting plausibly ex-
ogenous changes on the tax schedule in Mexico over 2005-14 which changed the
average tax rate faced by some workers more than others. We use large rotating
panel survey, which allows us to control for individual effects, time effects, season-
ality and a range of demographic, regional and industry-level factors. As tax rates
depend on income, which is potentially endogenous to informal status, we follow
Auten and Carroll (1999) and instrument actual average tax rates with the change
in tax rates based on lagged income. We find that an increase in average tax rate
leads to a statistically significant increase in transitions towards informality for
women and those with low incomes. The results are driven by low-income women,
for whom a 1 percentage point in average labor tax rates increases the probability
of being employed in the informal sector work by 1.5 percentage points. The result
is even stronger for women in rural areas. In contrast, there is little evidence that
higher tax rates increase the probability of transition to informal sector work for
men or those on higher income.
0Co-author: Steven Pennings (email: spennings@worldbank.org)
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21.1 Introduction
Informal employment is a characteristic of the labor market in most developing
economies. In Latin America1 it accounts for around 50 percent of total employ-
ment (Gasparini and Tornarolli, 2007), with a similar percentage for Mexico (Mal-
oney, 2004; INEGI, 2014) (see Figure 1.1).
Reducing informality is a pressing issue for policymakers all over the world and
Mexico is not an exception. Many scholars argue that the persistence of informality
in recent years in Mexico has been a major reason for its low productivity growth
(Matias Busso, 2012; Jorge Alonso Ortiz, 2011; Ordoñez, 2014; Levy, 2008). To
reduce informality, we need to firstly understand what are its determinants. The
literature suggests that income and social security taxes, government effectiveness,
the stringency of regulations and the economic environment are possible candidates
(Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro, 2010; Dougherty and Escobar, 2013).
The focus of this paper is on the effect of taxes and social security contributions
on transitions to and away from the informal labor sector, which are thought by
many to be among the main causes of informality (Levy, 2008; Pedro S. Amaral,
2006; Mariano Bosch and Campos-Vazquez, 2014). We focus on a labor market
definition of informal employment based on a lack of registration at the Mexi-
can Social Security Institute (IMSS), which is commonly used in the literature
(Dougherty and Escobar, 2013; Levy, 2008).2
Higher labor tax rates make informality more attractive because informal work-
ers don’t have to pay taxes, whereas formal sector workers do. Of course, there are
also advantages of formal sector employment (social security benefits for example),
1See the Appendix Table 1.E.1 for a complete list of informality definitions for each country.
2Illegality, as defined by Levy (2008) refers to the violation of laws regarding social security,
firing and severance pay, and labor taxes (which occur jointly). In this paper, we do not focus on
this characteristic of informality. Informality in Mexico is also not defined by the size of a firm,
the economic sector or activity, neither by the legality of the firm. These may be characteristics
that the informal sector share. For example, a large percentage of small firms are not registered
with a social security program. Also, the economic sectors are independent of formality and
informality. Both can occur in the agriculture, industry and services sector.
3but keeping benefits constant, higher labor taxes are thought to increase informal-
ity.3 While this mechanism is fairly straightforward, what we don’t know is: (i)
what is the size of these effects? (ii) do they apply to all workers equally, or only
to certain demographic or income-based groups? These questions are the focus of
this paper.
We investigate the effects of labor tax rates on informality using a large rotating
panel survey, which allows us to control for individual effects, time effects, lagged
income, seasonality and a range of demographic, regional and industry-level fac-
tors. Controlling for individual effects is particularly important given preferences
regarding informality are likely to be heterogeneous, and are possibly correlated
with those affecting incomes and tax rates. We exploit a number of tax reforms in
Mexico over 10 years between 2005-14, such as changes in the number and position
of tax brackets, and changes in the availability of tax credits. In some years reforms
raised average tax rates for low income earners relative to high income earners, and
in other years the opposite. Our time effects remove any economy-wide movements,
and so we rely on tax changes of some income earners relative to others. As average
tax rates depend on income, which is potentially endogenous to informal status,
we follow Auten and Carroll (1999) and instrument actual average tax rates with
the change in tax rates based on lagged income. To calculate average tax rates for
each worker, we manually apply tax rules, as described by the OECD. We calculate
hypothetical tax rates for informal workers (based on their reported earnings) and
“invert” the schedule to calculate gross income implied by the reported after-tax
income in our rotating panel survey.
Given our rich dataset, we are able to uncover some new stylized facts about
informality in Mexico. By constructing a proxy of the marginal product of labor
(MPL) for each worker we can measure how productivity changes when individuals
3As informality is an extensive margin decision rather than an intensive margin one, it is
important to look at the effect of average tax rates (rather than marginal tax rates). It is also
important to include all labor taxes: those on the employer and the employee.
4transition from the informal sector to the formal sector (or vice versa). Surprisingly,
we find the MPL only increased by about 13 percent (of the average) when workers
transition to the formal sector, and falls by a similar amount when they transit out
of it. This suggests relatively small static costs of informality, of only around 6.5
percent of GDP. However we do find that the MPL tends to grow around 2 percent
faster for formal sector workers than informal workers (even after controlling for
education, age, industry and other variables), which suggests that some of the
costs are dynamic. Like others in the literature, we find high rates of transition
in and out of formality — about 15 percent in and out of informality each year
for Mexico. This suggests that there is little segmentation between formal and
informal sectors. We also show that although informal sector wages are lower (on
average) than formal sector ones, there are many informal workers who earn more
than formal sector ones — suggesting that informal work is not just the reserve of
low wage occupations or those who were unable to find a job in the formal sector.
Returning to our main question, we find that an increase in average tax rates
only results in a statistically significant increase in the probability of being em-
ployed in the informal sector for women and low income workers, but not for the
population as a whole. This result is consistent with anecdotal evidence that women
and people with low income may be closer to being indifferent between working
in the formal or informal sector (Chant, 1991; Alter Chen, 2001; Bernal Salazar,
2009). On average a one percentage point increase in the income tax rate implies
an increase of around 0.8 percentage points in the probability of becoming infor-
mal (or not leaving formality) for women and a 1 percentage point increase for
people with low income. The results are strongest for low income women, where
a 1 percentage point increase in tax rates increases the probability of a transition
to informality by 1.55 percentage points. Further robustness checks also validate
these results.
5Figure 1.1: Informal employment is high in most Latin American countries
Source:CEDLAC and Gasparini and Tornarolli (2009) Note: The definition of informality for this
figure is the legalistic or social protection definition: A salaried worker is informal if s(he) does
not have the right to a pension linked to employment when retired.
Relation to literature To our knowledge, there are very few papers which
estimate the effect of taxes on informality. For example, while Anton, Hernandez,
and Levy (2013) and Levy (2008) argue that taxes on the formal sector are respon-
sible for encouraging informal employment, they don’t estimate the magnitude of
these effects.
The closest paper to ours is Schramm (2014), who estimates the equilibrium
effects of taxation on sectoral choice, work hours and wages in Mexico, finding that
workers are sensitive to income taxation. She shows that around 25 percent of
sectoral mobility from the period 1988-2004 is explained by changes in the average
tax rate.
Although we look at related issues in a similar context we have very different
approaches. Methodologically, Schramm (2014) takes a more structural approach
by estimating various elasticities in a model of informality. For example, she cal-
culates participation elasticities, the elasticity of substitution across skill levels,
etc. in a large system of equations — many of them estimated at higher levels
of aggregation. The effect of tax rates depends on all these elasticities, and may
6be model-dependent. In contrast, in this paper we estimate a reduced form rela-
tionship between average tax rates and informality that does not depend on the
structure of a particular model.
Crucially our samples are very different because Schramm’s sample includes
only men, whereas our most significant results are for female workers. We also
use a different sample of tax changes with Schramm (2014) using a 1988-2004
and our sample running from 2005-2014. Her dataset (the ENEU) only surveys
urban workers where as our strongest results are for rural workers (using a different
dataset, the ENOE).
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a broader literature
review on informality, Section 3 outlines methodology that will help with the un-
derstanding on how do the changes in taxes affect the level of informality in Mexico;
Section 4 discusses the data used, the tax changes in Mexico and presents three
stylized facts on informality in Mexico; Section 5 presents results, and Section 6
concludes.
1.2 Literature review
Background on informality. This section includes the main debates sur-
rounding informality. There are two main theories about informality in an econ-
omy. On one side of the spectrum, Fields (1975) and Mazumdar (1976) propose
segmentation models, where the supply of formal jobs is scarce, workers are waiting
for formal jobs but cannot afford being unemployed, ending up with an informal
job. On the other side, Maloney (Maloney, 1999; Maloney, 2004) and Levy (2008)
suggest two sector sorting models where informal workers self-select into informal
activities because they may earn more in informal self-employment compared to
what they could earn in formal jobs; they may also get more independence from
self-employment, more flexibility, and may not value protections such as health
7insurance which formal work offers them. Alternatively labor conditions have low
enforcement of labor regulations.
According to Fields (2009) there is a combination of the two main theories,
with a mix of segmented and self-selected individuals among informal workers.
Over the past few years, a growing theoretical literature explores models that
analyze the effect of different policies on the share of formal employment in the
economy. Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman (2009) claim that the size of the informal
sector depends mostly on the worker’s productivity levels. By using a model with
heterogeneous workers, low-productivity workers decide to become informally self-
employed. Mariano. Bosch et al. (2013) show that the effects of policies such as
introducing unemployment benefits on informality are larger compared to other
analysis where they do calibration exercises. Other models with heterogeneous
workers argue that worker’s education is one of the main determinants (Korlm
and Larsen, 2004), or productivity differences are the most important determinant
for changes in informality (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006). To sum up, the main
determinants that this literature includes are the mass of workers and firms that
are at the margin between formality and informality; and, how incentives such as
policy programs and tax rates change for firms and workers to operate formally
(Mariano Bosch and Campos-Vazquez, 2014).
Background on informality in Mexico. Many academics have studied
the informal sector in Mexico (Maloney, 2004; Arturo Anton Sarabia, 2013; Jorge
Alonso Ortiz, 2011; Anton, Hernandez, and Levy, 2013; Levy, 2008). Mariano
Bosch and Campos-Vazquez (2014) analyze the case of a social security program
in Mexico for informal workers; Levy (2008), Anton, Hernandez, and Levy (2013),
and Matias Busso (2012) estimate that controlling for size and sector of activity
at the six-digit level, Mexican informal firms are considerably less productive than
formal ones.
8Fiess, Fugazza, and Maloney (2010) analyze the cyclical behavior of informality
with a two sector model for a number of Latin American countries including Mex-
ico. The results turn out to be more complex than expected, where they confirm
that there are episodes where the expansion of informal self-employment is consis-
tent with the traditional segmentation views of informality, but they also identify
episodes where informal self-employment behaves “pro-cyclically”, driven by relative
demand or productivity shocks to the non-tradable sector. Fernandez and Meza
(2014) look also at the business cycle in Mexico comparing it with the labor market
in Canada. They conclude that the informal market is strongly counter-cyclical.
Ordoñez (2014) analyzes the distortions associated with the presence of an infor-
mal sector and incomplete tax enforcement. Using a dynamic general equilibrium
framework, he calibrates the model using Mexican data and finds that, under com-
plete enforcement, Mexico’s labor productivity and output would be 19 percent
higher under perfect competition, and 34 percent higher under monopolistic com-
petition. However, the distortions in Mexico lead to the misallocation of resources
towards small and unproductive plants as they engage in tax evasion; distortion in
occupational choices, as unproductive entrepreneurs are attracted to the market;
and distortions in the capital use of informal establishments, as they reduce their
scale to remain undetected.
Dougherty and Escobar (2013) conduct regression analysis to understand the
differences in the determinants of informality across Mexico’s states. They find
that there are multiple factors that explain the differences in informal employment
across Mexican states, such as per capita income, quality of labor skills, differences
in the prevalence of micro firms, cost to start a business, and rule of law among
others.
Levy (2008), Anton, Hernandez, and Levy (2013), and Matias Busso (2012)
analyze the implications of Mexico’s social insurance system in a context of infor-
mality. They argue that one of the causes of poor performance of Mexico’s tax
9system is the structure of incentives of the benefit systems. The formal sector con-
tributes through payroll taxes for the social benefits, whereas the informal sector
receives a bundle of benefits without paying any tax. This disparity leads to a more
attractive informal sector. Anton, Hernandez, and Levy (2013) further develop a
model to study the implications of the social insurance framework and propose a
reform to shift taxation for social insurance from labor to consumption, relying
largely on a reformed VAT.
While there have been many studies of the informal sector for the Mexican
economy, there is limited evidence on the sensitivity of workers to taxation for
developing countries.4
Informality and taxes in Mexico. This section includes a discussion of pa-
pers that have also done empirical research on the effect of taxes on informality in
Mexico. Anton, Hernandez, and Levy (2013) develop a model to study the implica-
tions of the social insurance5 architecture in Mexico in a context of informality and
imperfect tax enforcement. They argue that the current framework provides work-
ers with erratic and incomplete coverage against risks, fosters evasion and narrows
the tax base, de-links contributions from benefits undermining fiscal sustainability,
and distorts the labor market lowering real wages and total factor productivity.
While we do not analyze the distortions on total factor productivity, we also
find that the current framework fosters evasion and narrows the tax base. Anton,
Hernandez, and Levy (2013) show in their stylized facts that the distribution of
employment by formality status is characterized by a skewed size distribution of
firms, with a large number of mostly small informal firms evading taxes, on one end,
and a very small number of large establishments (mostly formal) complying with
taxes on the other end.6 They also find that Mexico’s labor market is characterized
by large mobility of workers between formal and informal status. Their research
4See Piketty and Saez (2012) and Schramm (2014).
5Social insurance is included in labor taxes in Mexico.
6Anton, Hernandez, and Levy (2013) use 2008 Census data in their section of stylized facts.
10
looks at changes only between 2007 and 2008, and show very similar results to
what we find by looking also at yearly and quarterly variations in informality.
Levy (2008) focuses on how social protection programs are distorting the labor
market. More specifically, subsidies to social security can segment the labor market
into a formal and an informal sector, even when there are no barriers to worker’s
mobility, such as binding minimum wages or others. He argues that because social
protection programs subsidize evasion of social security, as informality increases
the fiscal constraints under which social policy operates get tighter: more workers
receive free social benefits, and the tax base erodes as fewer firms and workers pay
taxes or contribute to social security.
Finally, Schramm (2014) estimates the equilibrium effects of taxation on sectoral
choice, work hours and wages in Mexico, finding that workers are sensitive to income
taxation. She shows that around 25 percent of sectoral mobility from the period
1988-2004 is explained by changes in the average tax rate.
Similarly, we examine the role of fiscal changes in Mexico’s recent history (2005-
2014) and its effect on the size of the informal sector. We exploit the exogenous
variation in the impact of tax rate changes across individuals, by looking at how
changes in the average labor tax rates affect the presence of an informal economy.
The identification strategy considers that changes in taxes are fairly random, since
the government does not target any particular sector of the population (formal
or informal). To our knowledge, there hasn’t been any research on the effects of
changes in labor taxes on informality over the period we estimate.
Our focus is solely on changes in tax rates that are driven by federal taxes.7
We look at the distribution of wages across individuals, and our sample allows us
to follow workers over time. We then estimate how changes in taxes are affecting
individuals to move from one sector to the other. Our results differ from previous
7Many states have implemented a small income tax in recent years of 1-2%. Taxes currently
collected on salaried labor by state governments are unrelated to social benefits. Income from
revenue-sharing formulas on taxes collected by the federal government and transfers from the
federal budget account for more than 90 percent of state’s revenues (Levy, 2008).
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research since we look at how changes in taxes are affecting at the individual level
the decision of moving from the formal to the informal sector. We find that on
average, tax changes increase the probability of an individual moving from the
formal to the informal sector.
History of the tax system in Mexico. The tax structure has been chang-
ing during the last few decades in Mexico, however the country has not been able
to significantly increase revenue from taxes. In general, tax revenue in Mexico
represented 13.68 percent of total GDP in 1990, which compared to other Latin
American countries is rather low. For example in Chile, it represented around
15.51 percent of GDP, and 21.43 for Brazil in 1990. In 2013, Mexico’s tax revenue
increased only to 16.62, while in Chile it increased to 18.79, 24.45 percent in Ar-
gentina, and 26.51 percent in Brazil.8 Income Tax Revenue has also been very low
for Mexico compared to other countries in the region. In 2013, it was only 5.96
percent of GDP, compared to 7.44 percent in Brazil, and 7.25 percent in Chile.
In OECD countries, income tax revenue reaches 11.38 percent in Germany, 12.11
percent in the United States, and 10.91 percent in France.
The 90’s were characterized by the entrance of Mexico in the OECD and the
adoption of the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the US and
Canada. The two events required the country to adopt a different economic struc-
ture that facilitated international trade and investment. This new structure was
characterized by a new development strategy based on economic openness, deregu-
lation, and privatization, together with an alternative tax structure. The extensive
tax reform implemented by President Salinas, consisted of reducing income tax
rates applicable to corporations in an effort to set a competitive level against trad-
ing partners. The maximum personal income tax rate was also lowered from 50
percent to 35 percent (Bernardi, 2008).
8See http://data.imf.org/?sk=77413F1D-1525-450A-A23A-47AEED40FE78 for further de-
tail.
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The tax system and informality continue to be at the center of public policy
debates in Mexico. For example 2014 tax reforms seek to promote the formalization
of the workforce via substantially reducing personal social security charges among
other changes.9 This is the last of a range of income tax changes over the past
decade which reformed the number of tax brackets: 5 income brackets from 2005
to 2007, to 8 income brackets between 2008 to 2013, and to 11 income brackets in
2014. See Section 1.C for further details on changes to the tax system over 2005-14.
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Conceptual framework and threats to identification
Consider the problem of a worker choosing between working in the formal and
the informal sector. If s/he works in the formal sector, there are a number of
social benefits, as well as greater job security, which will be idiosyncratically valued
by the worker. The availability of formal sector work will also vary with time-
invariant individual characteristics such as ability. If the worker chooses to be
informal, they (and their employer) do not have to pay taxes, though they also
lose some social benefits and may have a different level of productivity. We are
interested in estimating the effect of tax rates on informality, as avoiding these
taxes is hypothesized in the literature as a main advantage of informal sector work,
and is directly under control by the government. Crucially, as the formal/informal
decision is at the extensive margin rather than at the intensive margin, it is the
average tax rate which is the relevant concept (rather than the marginal tax rates).
Given this set up, one can imagine a simple reduced form specification for
individual j at time t as in Equation 1.1. Ijt is a dummy variable equal to 1
9The fiscal reform includes tax reductions that will decrease gradually over time until the
firms are incorporated in the general regime after ten years. The individual income tax, or ISR,
used to have several exemptions and deductions, which were mainly used by people with higher
incomes. Included in the latest changes, it was proposed a series of reforms that would increase
the individual ISR tax base by increasing contributions of people in the highest income bracket.
13
if the individual is informal and zero otherwise. τt(yit) is the average tax rate,
which includes all taxes on labor (employee income taxes, employee social security
taxes, employer social security taxes). The tax rate is a function of the individual’s
income in that year yit, though the tax code that maps incomes into average tax
rates applies to everyone but might change over time (and hence only has a time
subscript). Xjt/4 are a range of demographic, geographical, and sectoral trends
which could influence the formal/informal decision. γj is an individual effect, θt
is a time effect, θq is a seasonal effect, and ejt is an iid error capturing all other
random factors which might affect the individual’s formal/informal sector choice.10
We are interested in estimating β, the effect of a change in average tax rates on
the probability of informality.
P (Ijt = 1) = βτt(yit) + δXjt/4 + γj + θt + θq + ejt (1.1)
Problem 1A (individual heterogeneity): Unobserved characteristics γj
like culture, experience with informality, and preferences might affect both the
productivity yit (and hence average tax rates), as well as the individual’s choice
over informality. That is E[τt(yilt × γj] 6= 0
Problem 1B (seasonality): The seasonal demand for informal work (for ex-
ample during harvest) θq might be correlated with seasonal variation in formal
sector productivity (e.g. manufacturing in the lead up to Christmas) which deter-
mines tax rates. Our purpose is to isolate the effect of changes in average tax rates
on the probability of informality only, not because of a worker going from formal
to informal sector due to seasonal jobs.
To solve Problem 1 we take four-quarter ended difference (i.e. 2010Q1 less
2009Q1), which removes both the seasonal effect and the individual effect.
10θq could be included in the the time effects θt, but we add them separately to divide macroe-
conomic mechanisms driving θt from seasonality driving θq.
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P (Ijt = 1)− P (Ijt−4 = 1) = β∆4τt(yjt) + ∆4θt + δXj + ∆4ejt (1.2)
Problem 2 (time-varying macroeconomic effects): Macroeconomic shocks
might affect both tax rates (as the government tries to conduct counter-cyclical pol-
icy, or balance its budget), and the ability of the workers to get a job in the formal
sector, i.e. E[β∆τt(zjlt)×∆4θt] 6= 0
To solve this problem, we include time dummies γt in the estimated equation
1.2 to control for variation in ∆4θt. This also means that the only variation in tax
rates is cross-sectional.
Problem 3 (progressive/regressive tax schedules): As these are federal
taxes, the only way they vary across individuals is according to their incomes/pro-
ductivity y. This means that as taxable income rises (which might be negatively
related to informality), a worker’s average tax rate may also rise even if the tax
schedule has not changed. For example, suppose a worker learns a new skill which
is attractive to formal sector employers, then s/he will be less likely to be informal
and also the average tax rate paid will change (because the tax schedule is pro-
gressive/regressive), generating a spurious correlation between tax rates and the
probability of informality.
To see this more clearly, the change in tax rates can be decomposed into a com-
ponent working only through changes in income/MPL, and a component working
only through the tax code. That is, the change in average tax rate is represented
by:
∆4τt(yjt) ≡ τt(yjt)− τt−4(yjt−4) (1.3)
By adding and subtracting τt(yjt−4), this can be rearranged as:
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∆4τt(yjt) ≡ τt(yjt)− τt(yjt−4) + τt(yjt−4)− τt−4(yjt−4)
= τ¯t(∆4yjt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect through ∆MPL
+ ∆4τt(y¯jt−4)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Effect through ∆tax rates
(1.4)
The first component is the “endogenous” part operating through changes in
income (with tax rates constant)
τ¯t(∆4yjt) = τt(yjt)− τt(yjt−4) (1.5)
The second part is the “exogenous” component due to purely changes in the tax
code, keeping income constant at its previous level. Auten and Carroll (1999) call
this the “synthetic” change in taxes
∆4τt(y¯jt−4) = τt(yjt−4)− τt−4(yjt−4) (1.6)
To solve this problem we can use the exogenous component of the tax change
∆4τt(y¯jt−4) as instrument for the change in the tax rate faced by the worker
∆4τt(yjt). Changes in tax code ∆4τt(y¯jlt−4) are determined entirely at the federal
level (based on past incomes), they are uncorrelated with all individual productivity
shocks determining informality, i.e. the exclusion restriction E[τ¯jt(∆4yjlt)×ejt] = 0
is likely to hold (more on this below). Moreover, τ¯jt(∆4yjlt) is likely to be a very
strong instrument for ∆4[τt(yjlt)] because of Equation 1.4. See Auten and Carroll
(1999) for a further discussion on the endogeneity of the tax rate given changes in
income.
Problem 4 (omitted variable bias): It is possible that time-varying regional,
industry, demographic or income trendsXj affecting informality could be correlated
with changes in tax rates in small samples. To get around this problem, we include
a range of controls in the specification, described further below.
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1.3.2 Empirical strategy and specification
Our empirical strategy follows a difference-in-differences estimator by assessing
whether changes in average tax rates affect the probability of informality in the
overall population, as well as in more susceptible groups such as women, or poor
workers. As argued above, we work in differences to remove individual effects (as
well as seasonality), and instrument changes in average tax rates with a “synthetic”
tax rate variable only related to the change on the tax code. By construction,
the instrument eliminates the effect of income changes attributable to tax-induced
behavioral responses on the change in the tax price and only reflects the exogenous
statutory change in tax rates. It is this exogenous change in tax rates that is the
primary source of identification of the average tax rate in our model. We include
time dummies which remove all economy-wide changes in tax rates.
Our difference-in-difference study varies a little from the one typically used in
an analysis of policy variables. First, in a standard diff-in-diff study, the policy
only changes once (i.e. there is a comparison between pre-treatment and post-
treatment). In contrast, here statutory average tax rates change every year which
provides additional time series variation. Second, in the standard diff-in-diff study
there is a pure treated group (e.g. people eligible for a particular program) and
a pure control (people not eligible for the program). Here there is heterogeneous
treatment strength, because a change in tax rules will affect some tax payers more
than others (based on their incomes). Those with smaller changes in average tax
rates represent the control group, whereas those with larger changes represent the
treatment group.
As with any diff-in-diff study, the key identifying assumption is that, condition-
ing on observables, the policy change is randomly allocated. While this is difficult
to guarantee without a randomized control trial, we see little systematic variation
in average tax rates. Figures 1.3-1.5 (in the data section 1.4.2) plot the change in
average tax rates vs income for each year. In some years (like 2009-10) high income
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earners faced tax hikes and in other years (like 2006-07) they faced tax cuts. In
some years there were large discontinuities in tax changes, such as in 2007-08 some-
one earning around MXN$250,000 pesos would get a 2 percent tax cut, whereas
someone earning a few pesos more would get nothing. Similar changes occur at
around MXN$130,000 pesos in the same year, and right through 2005-06 when tax
brackets were extensively changed. The more contentious tax changes were the
increases in tax rates in 2009-2014 that focused on low income earners. This is
the result of an increase in the minimum wage (which indexes many allowances
and cutoffs in the tax system). Even in this case (i) there are opposite changes in
other years, such as a large fall in tax rates for low income earners in 2005-06, (ii)
we control for log of lagged income of the worker, and (iii) the discontinuities in
the way minimum wages affect tax rates, in particular around MXN$80,000 pesos.
Around half of the years have changes in average tax rates focused on low-income
earners as the minimum wage changed (which indexes many allowances and cutoffs
in the tax system)
Before turning to the empirical specification, we first need to deal with the issue
of probability of transition. We assume a linear probability model (LPM), where
changes in explanatory variables have a linear effect on the change in probability.
Econometrically, if is difficult (or impossible) to estimate using alternatives like
fixed effects Probit using standard methodologies (instrumental variables also make
things more challenging). To estimate a linear probability model, we simply replace
the P (I = 1) in Equation 1.2, with a dummy variable for informality. After taking
differences, this means that the change in informality variable ∆4Ijt can take three
values: zero for no change in status; 1 for a transition from formality to informality,
or -1 for a transition from informality to formality.
Our specification can be represented in two stages. First we regress the change
in the actual average tax rate ∆4τt(yjt) on the change in the “synthetic tax price”
∆4τt(y¯jt−4) and the other exogenous variables (Equation 1.1). Consistent estimates
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of β are obtained by regressing the change in informality on the fitted average tax
rate from the first stage, as well as the exogenous controls.11
Although the specification is represented in two stages, the estimation of both
steps is always estimated together to make sure the standard errors are correct.
We also cluster the standard errors at the state level to control for potential serial
correlation over the regions.
∆4τt(yjt) = α∆4τt(y¯jt−4) + υXj + γt (1.7)
∆Ijt = β ̂∆4τt(yjt) + δXj + γt + ∆4ejt (1.8)
Controls. Finally, the specification includes a wide range of controlsXj which
are designed to solve Problem 4 of omitted variable bias. Most important is
log(yjt−4). We know that the probability of informality (and transitions into/out
of informality) depend on income, and that income can also affect tax rates. So
we add a control for log of lagged gross income to make sure that the tax rate is
not proxying for the income level/productivity of the worker. Age and age squared
are also included to control for life cycle effects, and controls for whether female
workers are married.
Another group of variables are connected to the regional or sectoral labor mar-
ket. For example, in a year that the legislature lowered taxes on low-income earn-
ers, the poorest regions of Mexico happened to have an economic expansion, which
lowered informal employment. This should not lead to inconsistency, but in finite
samples might lead to incorrect inference. One could make a similar case for shocks
hitting industries with a large share of informal employees, like retail. To reduce
the change of biased estimates, Xj includes dummy variables for over 20 industries
11We also include the reduced form estimation of the change in informality on the “synthetic”
tax rate τt(y¯jt−4). Because the first stage estimates of α are generally close (though slightly
below) unity, the OLS estimates are slightly smaller.
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and more than 35 regions (cities and rural areas) in Mexico.
1.4 Data and Stylized Facts
1.4.1 Data
We have 2 sources of data to look at the labor market effects of tax policy. First,
we use micro-data from the Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE), from
2005 to 2014 (10 years). The second is the OECD tax data, which we discuss
below.
ENOE. The Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE)12 is the survey
that the Mexican government relies on for calculating unemployment statistics and
the size of the informal sector. The ENOE has been conducted each quarter since
2005Q1 and covers a random sample of approximately 120,260 households. Each
household remains in the survey for five consecutive quarters. We use data for
2005-Q1 to 2014Q2 (34 quarters in total).
This sample allows us to observe individuals in each household with respect
to their labor characteristics such as earnings, occupation, industry and benefits.
As in many other labor surveys, Mexico’s ENOE13 includes a question addressing
whether or not the surveyed employee is affiliated with the Mexican Social Security
Institute (IMSS), allowing us to classify the workers as formal if the employee
is registered with the IMSS and informal otherwise. The survey also includes
demographic characteristics for each individual such as metropolitan area, state,
gender, age, marital status, and education level.
The use of panel data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity which
12http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/proyectos/encuestas/hogares/
regulares/enoe/default.aspx
13While there are other surveys that can capture informality in Mexico, such as National
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de Hogares,
ENIGH), which includes more household characteristics, they lack the panel dimension that allows
us to study worker flows, seasonality, and the business cycles.
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might be correlated with changes in tax rates. It also allows us to remove season-
ality. As discussed below, we calculate the change in informal sector status over
the five quarters the individual is in the sample. Because these are consecutive,
the first and last quarter are in the same time of the calendar year, which removed
seasonal transitions in informality — for example due to harvest or planting. Work-
ing in changes rather than levels differences out the individual effect. As we only
calculate the annual change for the last observation for each individual, the sample
size is only 20 percent of its initial size. As in many other surveys, income data is
missing for around 21 percent of surveyed individuals, which substantially reduces
our sample size. We also condition on the individual working which leaves around
300,425 household members of legal working age (between 16 to 65 years old) with
employment data.
OECD Tax Data. The second source of data is on historical tax rates, col-
lected for the Mexican tax code for 2005-2014 by the OECD.14 The analysis focuses
only on labor income,15 since it constitutes the largest share of total income for
most workers.16
Employers withhold provisional tax payments on wage earnings, which they
remit to the tax authorities. Employed individuals are also required to make so-
cial security contributions, with the amount based on the individual’s salary. We
use after-tax labor income and the tax schedule to impute pre-tax income (“gross
income”), income and payroll tax rates.
Summary Statistics. Table 1.1 includes summary statistics for the sample.
For the 10 years of data available, the female and male population have similar
characteristics, with an average age of 38 years and around 9-10 years of education
(also considering rural areas). Close to 50 percent of the sample is formal, with
14http://www.sat.gob.mx/informacion_fiscal/tablas_indicadores/Paginas/default.
aspxandOECD
15Personal income tax is required of all Mexican residents.
16The tax base includes income from wages, pensions, and financial capital, but unfortunately
non-labor earnings are not available at the individual or household levels.
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about 5 percent lower net income when the sample includes female workers. The
average tax rate has been close to 15 percent for that period. Finally, changes in
the tax schedule using past income vary between around -5 percent to +2 percent.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Individual Level (Female and Male workers age 16 to 65)
Age 38 0.112 17 65 299,799
Years completed in school 9.5 4.3 0 23 299,470
Informal 0.43 0.495 0 1 299,799
Net Income 60,750 35,979 7,740 301,350 299,799
Gross Income 63,637 43,200 7,740 302,469 299,799
Average Tax Rate 0.155 0.042 0.082 0.311 299,799
Ch Tax Rate (pastinc) -0.002 0.011 -0.045 0.017 299,799
Panel B: Individual Level (Male workers age 16 to 65)
Age 38 0.114 17 65 197,497
Years completed in school 9.12 4.2 0 23 197,290
Informal 0.45 0.50 0 1 197,497
Net Income 63,103 35,940 7,740 300,000 197,497
Gross Income 66,085 43,179 7740 302,469 197,497
Average Tax Rate 0.157 0.042 0.082 0.311 197,497
Ch Tax Rate (pastinc) -0.002 0.011 -0.045 0.017 197,497
Panel C: Individual Level (Female workers age 16 to 65)
Age 38 0.108 17 65 102,302
Years completed in school 10.4 4.4 0 23 102,180
Informal 0.37 0.49 0 1 102,302
Net Income 56,208 35,618 7,740 301,350 102,302
Gross Income 58,910 42,848 7,740 302,469 102,302
Average Tax Rate 0.151 0.042 0.082 0.311 102,302
Ch Tax Rate (pastinc) -0.001 0.011 -0.045 0.017 102,302
Sample trimmed by top and bottom 1% of net income. The sample is restricted to one
observation per individual.
1.4.2 Tax Changes in Mexico
The income tax thresholds and rates change frequently during the analyzed period,
2005-2014. Personal income tax is applied after discounting the tax allowance,
which includes a yearly holiday bonus and an end-of-year bonus. Informal sector
workers evade taxation completely. Figure 1.2 shows the average income tax rate,
which includes social security contributions from employers and employees, as a
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function of the before tax (gross) wage. An interesting feature of the Mexican tax
system is large discontinuities in the average tax rate, which suggests a large jump
in the tax bill of a worker when they earn an extra peso. For example, at around
MXN$88,000 pesos the tax rate jumps by about 3 ppts. This reflects the loss
of a tax credit of MXN$2,600 pesos for people earning over MX$88,000. Ideally
we would like to use discontinuities econometrically (known as “bunching” in the
literature), but this is not possible without administrative data on tax records as
our measures of gross income and average tax rates for each individual are only
approximate.
Figures 1.3-1.5 provide an illustration of the size of tax rate changes for each
year, which is our instrument of the change in the average tax rate faced by each
individual. We provide a brief overview here, although in Appendix 1.C we include
a detailed narrative of the changes each year.17
• From 2005-06 there were major redrafting of the income tax brackets. The
number of brackets remained the same, but the tax rates changed for workers
earning between MXN$44,000 and MXN$100,000.
• In 2007 there was a tax reform that reduced tax rates, especially for higher
earners, from 29 percent to 28 percent, resulting in a decline in tax rates,
especially for high income earners.
• In 2008 there was a major tax reform that increased the number of brackets
from 5 to 8, with the largest tax rate at 28 percent. The new brackets lowered
taxes for workers earning less than MXN$392,000 pesos.
• Figures for 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 all have very similar shapes. In
each of these years there were minor changes to statutory tax rates (2009 to
2010 and 2013 to 2014), though the minimum wage did change. Taxpayer’s
access to a number of tax credits depends on their incomes as multiple of the
17The formulas to calculate the average income tax are also explained on the Appendix.
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minimum wages, and as the minimum wage increases their average tax rates
also change.
• The figure for 2010 looks like a combination of the figures for 2009 and 2011-
14, but with a rate increase for those earning over MXN$123,000. This
was a result of an increase in the average tax rate from 19.94 percent to
21.36 percent for workers earning between MXN$123,000 and MXN$249,000.
There were also increases in the average tax rate for workers earning between
MXN$250,000 and MXN$392,000 pesos.
Figure 1.2: Overview: Average tax rate (incl. emp SS) & Net income
(MXN pesos)
Notes: Gross incomes interpolated for formal sector workers. Data dropped for 363 workers where
this algorithm did not converge. See text for further details.
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Figure 1.3: Annual Tax schedule changes (2005-07)
(a) Average tax rates (2005-06) (b) Change in tax rate (2006)
(c) Average tax rates (2006-07) (d) Change in tax rate (2007)
(e) Average tax rates (2007-08) (f) Change in tax rate (2008)
1.4.3 Stylized facts
Formal and informal sector workers are different, but not as much as some might
think. Table 1.2, compares a number of demographic characteristics for formal
and informal workers and for men and women. The most noticeable differences
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Figure 1.4: Annual Tax schedule changes (2008-11)
(a) Average tax rates (2008-09) (b) Change in tax rate (2009)
(c) Average tax rates (2009-10) (d) Change in tax rate (2010)
(e) Average tax rates (2010-11) (f) Change in tax rate (2011)
between sectors are the education levels. Women and men working in the informal
sector typically have 2-3 years less education than women and men who are in the
formal sector. Women in the formal sector are slightly younger than women in
the informal sector, while men in the formal sector are slightly older than in the
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Figure 1.5: Annual Tax schedule changes (2011-14)
(a) Average tax rates (2011-12) (b) Change in tax rate (2012)
(c) Average tax rates (2012-13) (d) Change in tax rate (2013)
(e) Average tax rates (2007-2008) (f) Change in tax rate (2014)
informal sector.
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Income and informality
After tax income in the informal sector average MXN$20,000-30,000 less than the
formal sector, with a larger gap for women than for men. Pooling across genders,
mean income is around MXN$46,000 pesos annually for informal workers, while
for formal workers it is around MXN$71,000 pesos. The distribution of formal and
informal wages is shown in Figure 1.6. Unsurprisingly the income distribution for
informal workers is generally to the left of that for formal sector workers. However,
many informal workers earn more than formal workers, which refutes many of the
stereotypes that formal sector work is exclusively high paid, and informal sector
work is exclusively poorly paid.
Stylized Fact 1: Although average incomes are lower for informal workers than
formal sector workers, many informal sector workers earn more than formal sector
workers.
Table 1.2: Sample Statistics by Labor Market State and Gender
Men Women
Variable Informal Formal Informal Formal
Age 37.8 38.2 38.9 37.8
Years completed in school 7.5 10.4 7.9 11.8
Net Income 51,046 73,075 37,249 67,684
Gross Income 51,046 78,524 37,249 72,021
Average Tax Rate 0.144 0.168 0.132 0.163
Change in Tax Rate (past-income) -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.002
Observations 89,401 108,096 38,574 63,728
Does moving to the formal sector increase wages? The key question for
a worker deciding whether to work in the formal or informal sector is their income
in each sector.18
Conceptually, the fact that wage distributions of formal and informal sector
workers are overlapping means that moving from informal to formal sector could
18Of course, there are also other considerations, such as the social security and health insurance
benefits of working in the formal sector, though as Levy (2008) points out these benefits are
weakened now that Mexico has rolled out social benefits for informal workers.
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Figure 1.6: Kernel Density
lower or raise one’s take-home pay. Differences in means are uninformative be-
cause, as we have shown in Table 1.2, informal and formal sector workers vary in
characteristics like education which determine wages.
To get around this problem we run a regression of the year-ended growth rate
of wages of the same worker (e.g. the wage in 2006Q1 relative to 2005Q1) on
3 dummies representing changes in labor market status. The excluded baseline
of wage growth for workers always in the formal sector is captured by the con-
stant. By studying changes rather than levels, we “difference out” many of the
individual-specific characteristics which might be correlated both with productiv-
ity and preference for formal sector work.19 From a policy perspective, one would
19As Levy (2008) discusses, comparing wage rates across workers presents methodological dif-
ficulties —most important is the central problem of causal inference since we only observe one
of the potential outcomes, the other potential outcome is missing. Second, it is also difficult to
identify whether differences in wage rates between formal and informal salaried workers result
from differences in labor status or from unobserved variables, even after controlling for age, gen-
der, and years of schooling. Third, in the case of self employed workers, it is difficult to separate
earnings into imputed wages and returns to productive assets, and in the case of consultants it is
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like to use the change in wage income when informal workers become formal as a
partial equilibrium approximation of the economic costs of informality.20
Levy (2008) argues that a simple approximation of the increase in output for
one worker moving from the informal to formal sectors is MPLf −MPLi = wATf +
Tf − wi where wATf is the after tax formal sector wage, Tf is the taxes paid on
formal sector employment and wi is the informal sector wage. Tf can be divided
into three parts: T ITf (employee income tax); T
SSw
f (employee social security taxes);
and T SSef ((employer social security taxes). The gross wage is wf = w
AT
f + T
IT
f .
We construct our measure of MPLf = wf + T SSwf , such that MPLf −MPLi is
the measure of lost productivity from that reallocated worker. In contrast, Levy
(2008) compares wATf and wi, which he rightly argues cannot be interpreted as the
productivity differential between formal and informal sector workers.
We construct three measures of the change in the MPL or wage growth. The
first is standard change in the gross wage rate for individual j, that is gwj,t =
(wj,t −wj,t−4)/wj,t−4. This is the simplest measure, but does not include the effect
of employers payroll taxes, and so is not appropriate for calculating productivity
differences. The second measure is similar, but the growth rate of the MPL includes
employers social security taxes gMPLj,t ≡ (MPLj,t −MPLj,t−4)/MPLt−4. The
problem is that if MPLj,t−4 is “too low” for some reason (such as someone working
part time, or because of a reporting error), this will cause the growth rate to “blow
up”, which has an influence on the estimations. Our preferred measure of the
change in the MPL when a worker transfers from the informal to formal sectors
is gaMPLj,t ≡ (MPLj,t −MPLj,t−4)/ ¯MPLt−4. This measure is very similar to
the growth rate in the MPL, but instead of normalizing by last year’s individual
MPL we normalize by the average MPL ( ¯MPLt−4), which reduces the sensitivity to
outliers.21 To further reduce the sensitivity to outliers, we drop the top and bottom
difficult to separate imputed wages from compensation for risk or entrepreneurial ability.
20Of course there will also be general equilibrium effects as prices change and capital is reallo-
cated, etc.
21For example if the household earned MXN$62,500 in 2010Q4, but MXN$6,250 (due to an
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5 percent of observations in the default specification, and consider robustness tests
dropping the top or bottom 1 percent or 10 percent of observations.
The results using our preferred measure (gaMPLj,t) are presented in the final
two columns of Table 1.3 and suggest that when workers move from the informal
sector to the formal sector, their MPL (as defined above) increases by 13 percent
of the average (relative to always informal benchmark).22
Likewise, when individuals transfer from formal sector work to informal sector
work, their wage falls by around 11-12 percent of the average (relative to always-
formal benchmark). Note that the estimated coefficients in the simple specification
(Column 5) are very similar to the full specification (Column 6), which includes
controls for age, education, number of workers in establishment, or sector (all the
observable individual characteristics available from ENOE).
Stylized Fact 2:
1. If a worker moves from the informal to formal sectors, their labor productivity
increases by around 13 percent (relative to staying in the informal sector).
Likewise if a formal sector worker becomes informal, their MPL falls by 11-12
percent (relative to the always formal worker).
2. Many of the productivity gains of formal sector employment are dynamic.
An always-formal worker tends to increase their labor productivity about 2-3
percent faster than an always-informal worker (though this depends on they
way the transition is measured).
Levy (2008) argues that the static loss of GDP from informal labor is (MPLf−
MPLi)×∆L, where ∆L is the proportion of workers that would move from informal
to formal sector if informal sector work lost its implicit subsidy. An upper bound
reporting error) in 2009Q4, then then increase would be a 900 percent increase in gMPLj , whereas
only a 90 percent increase in gaMPLj .
22This is calculated as the difference in coefficients between the informal-formal gaMPL and
the informal-informal gaMPL.
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for ∆L is around 50 percent if all informal workers become formal.23 As such, the
static loss of GDP due to informal employment is at most 6.5 percent GDP. Of
course, there may be second round GE effects, but for a simple partial equilibrium
approximation this is remarkably small.
The calculation above also ignores the dynamic gains from being formal. The
estimates in Table 1.3 suggest that formal sector workers tend to increase their
productivity by around 2 percent faster than informal sector workers. This might
not sound like much, but if a formal and informal sector worker initially had the
same productivity after 35 years the always-formal sector worker would be twice as
productive as the always-informal sector worker. As around 50 percent of workers
are informal, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that aggregate labor pro-
ductivity would grow 1 percent faster if Mexico did not have any informal workers.
This finding is robust to controls for a range of socio-economic factors (Column 6),
though of course there is always a chance that it could be related to unobserved
characteristics of always-formal workers.
Robustness. In Table 1.3 we include two other measures: the growth rate
of gross wages gw, and the growth rate of MPL gMPL. For informal-formal
transitions, the estimated increase in labor productivity is very similar at around
14-15 percent (relative to an always informal baseline), while moving from the
formal to informal sector drops MPL by about 12 percent (Column 3-4). Results
are quire different when we turn to always-informal wage growth, which is now
marginally higher than always formal wage growth. As mentioned above, this is
probably because this measure puts a lot weight on large increases in the MPL, and
so should be treated with caution. All the estimated growth rates of gross wages
(gw) are much closer to zero, reflecting the absence of employer social security taxes
23An important caveat here is that we are assuming that the gain in MPL applies to all of the
50 percent of informal workers. This is actually a conservative assumption, because transitions
from informal → formal which drive our estimates of the change in MPL are likely to be those
with the largest increases in productivity from this transition. The productivity losses of a large
increase in informality could be much much larger because there are unobserved always-formal
workers who are much more productive in the formal than informal sectors.
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(Columns 1-2). Given the stereotypes around the informal sector, it is striking that
gross wage rates are essentially constant when workers move between formal and
informal sectors.
In additional results (not reported), we re-estimate Table 1.3 removing 1 percent
outliers or 10 percent outliers (rather than 5 percent as in Table 1.3). For gaMPL
(our preferred measure), the results are very similar with the alternative outlier
classification. Removing 10 percent outliers makes the change in wages in/out of
informality a couple of percentage points closer to zero; removing 1 percent outliers
makes then a couple of percentage points larger. For the always-informal worker,
the 2 percent fall in MPL relative the always-formal is similar in the 10 percent
outliers sample, though larger (around 5 percent fall in MPL) in the 1 percent
outlier sample. As previously mentioned gMPL and gw are much more sensitive
to outliers, especially using only the 1 percent outlier cutoff.
How persistent is informality?
As discussed above, there are two views of informality: one is that informal workers
are “segmented” from the rest of the labor market by barriers to entry such as a
lack of available formal sector jobs, their cultural background or lack of experience;
another is that many workers are close to indifferent to being in the formal or
informal sectors, especially given the provision of the benefits for the informal (like
Seguro Popular). In the “segmented markets” case, we would expect very little
movement between sectors, whereas if workers are close to indifferent then small
changes in benefits or wages can make them transition in and out of the informal
sector — increasing turnover.
Table 1.4 suggests that transitions in and out of informality are quite high,
which is inconsistent with the segmented markets view. Specifically around 14
percent of workers move between status from one year to the next.24 These results
24We are only taking into consideration workers between the ages 16 and 65, and are looking
at year-ended changes, which remove seasonal transitions
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Table 1.3: Change in wage rates switching between formal to informal
sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Growth Wage Growth Wage gMPL gMPL gaMPL gaMPL
Informal-Informal 0.0067*** 0.012*** 0.0092*** 0.016*** -0.035*** -0.022***
(0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.00096) (0.0017)
Formal-Informal -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.11***
(0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0023)
Informal-Formal 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Age -0.0029*** -0.0029*** 0.00099***
(0.00031) (0.00031) (0.00024)
Squared age 0.000028*** 0.000029*** -0.000011***
(3.99e-06) (3.91e-06) (3.07e-06)
Junior high -0.0012 0.0056 0.0099
(0.031) (0.030) (0.023)
High school -0.0051 0.0021 0.018
(0.031) (0.030) (0.023)
High school+ -0.0057 0.0017 0.047**
(0.031) (0.030) (0.023)
1-10 workers -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.018***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015)
11-50 workers -0.0050*** -0.0041*** -0.0074***
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014)
Written contract 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.038***
(0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0021)
No written contract -0.0068*** -0.0087*** -0.0039**
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0016)
Agriculture -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.028***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0021)
Mining 0.0098 0.0070 0.024***
(0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0074)
Electricity 0.0028 0.00038 0.0086
(0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0073)
Manufacturing -0.0064*** -0.0062*** -0.027***
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0018)
Commerce 0.0038* 0.0032 -0.021***
(0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0019)
Transportation 0.0082*** 0.0075** 0.0098***
(0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0027)
Services 0.0027 0.0016 -0.010***
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0017)
Urban location -0.0045*** -0.0042** 0.0033***
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0013)
Constant 0.060*** 0.14*** 0.058*** 0.13*** 0.072*** 0.040*
(0.00072) (0.032) (0.00069) (0.031) (0.00071) (0.023)
Observations 280,171 280,171 280,936 280,936 278,685 278,685
R-squared 0.002 0.003 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.043
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant
at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level. These results drop the top and bottom 5% of wage growth
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are similar to other evidence for Mexico. Specifically Anton, Hernandez, and Levy
(2013), shows that between 87-91 percent of workers kept their formal/informal
status between 2007 and 2008, while around 12 percent of formal workers became
informal and 9 percent of informal workers became formal. Our results show that
pooling results for 10 years, results are similar — albeit with slightly more tran-
sitions. Anton, Hernandez, and Levy (2013) further decomposes these transitions
into within-job and between-job, and find that around 6-9 ppts of the transitions
between the informal and formal sector (i.e. the majority) involve no change of
job.25
Stylized Fact 3: Formal and informal status are very fluid in Mexico. Around
15 percent of workers transition between formal and informal sectors each year,
excluding seasonal transitions, with means around 85 percent of workers remain in
their current status.
But those transitions are accentuated by looking at workers classified by gender
and education. Our results suggest that women have slightly less mobility compared
to men from one year to the next. Specifically, 11 percent of female informal workers
move to the formal sector each year, and 13 percent of female formal sector workers
become informal. In contrast, these two numbers are 14 percent and 16 percent
(respectively) for male workers. Literature suggests (Arturo Anton Sarabia, 2013;
Levy, 2008; Maloney, 2004) higher levels of education are correlated with increased
skills, hence higher productivity. Using a Logit model, Maloney (2004) shows that
workers are less likely to leave formal employment for self-employment (or any
other informal sector) as education levels increase. Table 1.4 and Table 1.A.1 show
that workers with lower skill levels are likely to transition from formal to informal
25Using IMSS data, Levy (2008) describes the informal/formal history of workers. He reports
that there are around 15 million changes in worker registration per year, with a total stock of
formal workers of around 13 million. Levy (2008) also reports that high income workers have an
average stay in the formal sector of 77 percent of their working time (over a ten-year period),
while low-wage workers only 49 percent were employed in the formal sector for ten continuous
years. On average, he finds that over a ten-year period a worker enrolled in IMSS in 1997, spent
67 percent of the time in the formal sector, and 33 percent of the time in a different labor status.
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more often. It could be implied that these workers are the ones at the margin, with
income levels that do not change much by being in an informal job or a formal one.
Our main analysis is carried out using only the selection of workers who are
employed (formally or informally). We are aware that it could represent a problem
if unemployment is also a relevant alternative to employment. Table 1.5 displays
the transition matrix among 3 stages: formality, informality and unemployment.
Overall, the probability to remain formal if the worker was formal in the first
period is of 56 percent. The probability to become unemployed is 28 percent, while
the probability of becoming informal is lower, with 15 percent. The results are
similar for women and men separately. The Table suggests that the transition to
unemployment could be another possible outcome. However, when we include all
controls and focus on how changes in taxes could affect the outcome of transitioning
to unemployment, the results suggest that changes in taxes do not lead workers to
unemployment (see Table 1.10 in the Results section).
Table 1.4: Annual workers transitions between formality and informality
Change Formalt Informalt
Panel A: Workers status change
Formalt−1 85% 15%
Informalt−1 13% 87%
Panel B: Male Workers status change
Formalt−1 84% 16%
Informalt−1 14% 86%
Panel C: Female Workers status change
Formalt−1 87% 13%
Informalt−1 11% 89%
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Table 1.5: Annual workers transitions between formality and unemploy-
ment
Change Formalt Informalt Unemployedt
Panel A: Workers status change
Formalt−1 57% 15% 28%
Informalt−1 12% 58% 30%
Unemployedt−1 27% 48% 25%
Panel B: Male Workers status change
Formalt−1 55% 16% 29%
Informalt−1 11% 59% 30%
Unemployedt−1 26% 50% 24%
Panel C: Female Workers status change
Formalt−1 61% 13% 26%
Informalt−1 15% 57% 28%
Unemployedt−1 33% 41% 26%
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Main results
In this section, we use regression analysis to assess the effect of changes in the
average tax rate on the probability of a worker choosing to work in formal and
informal sectors. We first present results for all workers, women and men (Table
1.6), and then break down the sample by income, income and gender, as well as
presenting heterogeneous effects with respect to a range of different sub-samples
such as by education, age and urban/rural. As mentioned above, we estimate
mostly using 2SLS. The first stage is extremely strong: the coefficient on τit(yt−4)
(the instrument) is between 0.7 and 1 with first-stage F-statistics several orders of
magnitude above the cutoff of 10.
Table 1.6 shows that for all workers, although there is a significant relation
between transitions into informality and average tax rates (Column 1) in simple
specifications, it is not robust to controls for time industry and geographic fixed
effects (Column 2). Results are similar using a reduced form OLS specification of
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informality transitions on tax rates calculated using past income τit(yt−4).
Gender. The overall insignificant results reflect heterogeneous treatment by
gender. For women26 even when controlling for time, industry and city effects,
the results in column (4) and (5) show that a one percentage point increase in
the average tax rate also increases the probability of a woman working in the
informal labor sector by 0.74 percentage points, significant at the 5 percent level.
The OLS results in column (5) are similar, using as the independent variable the
“synthetic” change in average tax rates τit(yt−4). For men however, this result
although positive is not significant (columns 6 and 7). In all our results we also
control for the lag of gross income (1 year lag) in order to control for the effect of
taxes on informality independently of the income level.27 Our results are consistent
with literature findings, which suggest that women are on average more likely to
work in the informal sector and are on average more sensitive to an increase in
taxes (Gelber and Mitchell, 2012; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meghir and Phillips,
2008; Alter Chen, 2001; Bernal Salazar, 2009; Biles, 2009; Chen, 2007).
There have been a large number of studies that have focussed on the effect of
taxes on women’s labor force participation. An example is Gelber and Mitchell
(2012), the authors find that labor force participation among single women in-
creases when “the fraction of their earnings taken away in taxes falls”.28 Similarly,
Meghir and Phillips (2008) suggest that taxes and benefits affect differently certain
groups of the population. For instance, groups such as women with young children
are more sensitive to whether to work or not as well as how many hours they work
depending on the levels of taxes and benefits they receive.
A number of other controls are important. The log of lagged gross income is
significant and positive. This suggests that workers who previously had higher
26For women, we also include a dummy variable for marriage, since the literature suggests
that women are more vulnerable to work on the informal sector if there is an increase in taxes
(Maloney, 2004; Correia, 2001).
27We estimate gross income by using observed after-tax labor income and the tax schedule to
impute pre-tax income.
28See also Eissa and Liebman (1996) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001)
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income are more likely to transition to informality, which might be mean reversion
after they earned more at a temporary formal job. Higher income workers are
generally less likely to be informal, other things equal, but this is differenced out
when we study changes in informality. Age is positive but age squared is negative,
indicating that the probability of being employed informally is inverse-U shaped
in age. Being married also seems to have an effect on informal transitions, as do
many of industry, time and location dummies included in the model.
Table 1.6: Main regression results — higher taxes increase informality
for women, but not for men or overall
Informal - Lag(4) Informal
Full sample Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Change tax 0.28*** 0.15 0.74** -0.15
(0.075) (0.18) (0.31) (0.24)
Change tax (past income) 0.34* 0.59* -0.12
(0.17) (0.33) (0.19)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.027***
(0.0015) (0.0030) (0.0016) (0.0043) (0.0023) (0.0044) (0.0020)
Age 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.43*** 0.43***
(0.047) (0.051) (0.065) (0.064) (0.054) (0.060)
Age squared -0.0046*** -0.0044*** -0.0041*** -0.0046*** -0.0047*** -0.0046***
(0.00059) (0.00062) (0.00083) (0.00076) (0.00068) (0.00073)
Married 0.0053*** 0.0056***
(0.0020) (0.0020)
First stage coefficient 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.88*** 0.96***
(0.0077) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
Industry FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 300,425 303,625 300,425 102,450 112,830 197,975 198,676
F-statistic 15,195.44 3,829.69 1,740.70 2,408.77
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The OLS results use use the method of Cameron, Gelbach,
& Miller (2008) wherein the null distribution of the t-statistic is estimated by running the model in a series of bootstrap samples to deal
with a small number of clusters and give more robustness to our results. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year
fixed effects and city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
Income. From Figure 1.6 we know that informality is concentrated among
low-income workers, because it is simply not possible for a number of high-income
professional occupations to exist in the shadows.29
Table 1.7 shows that average tax rates only have an effect for low income work-
29Levy (2008) argues that “capital and technology intensive activities requiring salaried labor
are subject to indivisibility and minimum scale, making informal operation prohibitively costly”
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ers. When we split the sample at the mean gross income30 of about MX$62,500
(around USD$4000 exchange rates in early 2015), the results are striking. A one
percentage point increase in the average tax increased the probability of being in
the informal sector (or reduces the probability of being in the formal sector) by
around 1 percentage point for low-income workers (Column 1), but there is no effect
for high income workers (Column 2). However, it is not just income in itself which
is important, but a combination of income and gender. For lower-income women,
a 1ppt increase in average tax rates lead to a 1 to 1.5 percentage point increase in
the probability of transition to informality. In contrast, taxes have little effect on
transition probabilities for low income men (Column 5). For high-income workers
of both genders there is no significant relationship between average tax rates and
the transition to informality (Columns 4 and 6).
Table 1.7: Changes in taxes are contributing to increasing informality
specially for the poor
Informal - Lag(4) Informal
Full sample Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income< MX62,400 Income> MX62,400 Income< MX62,400 Income> MX62,400 Income< MX62,400 Income> MX62,400
Change tax 0.95*** 0.066 1.47*** -0.65 0.53 0.36
(0.33) (0.45) (0.54) (0.64) (0.48) (0.58)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income -0.0014 0.031*** 0.011*** 0.0045 -0.011** 0.043***
(0.0031) (0.0099) (0.0042) (0.014) (0.0044) (0.013)
Married 0.0060** 0.0019
(0.0023) (0.0033)
Age 0.47*** 0.090 0.40*** 0.47*** 0.53*** -0.064
(0.047) (0.12) (0.072) (0.17) (0.056) (0.14)
Age squared -0.0049*** -0.00084 -0.0036*** -0.0050** -0.0058*** 0.00087
(0.00058) (0.0014) (0.00091) (0.0021) (0.00070) (0.0017)
First stage coefficient 0.73*** 0.88*** 0.73*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 0.89***
(0.016) (0.046) (0.018) (0.074) (0.025) (0.047)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 194,529 105,280 71,428 30,876 123,101 74,404
F-statistic 2021.68 355.81 1649.29 132.47 826.35 355.88
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter × year fixed effects and city fixed effects. *** is
significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
1.5.2 Robustness tests
So far we have shown that there is some evidence that increases in average income
tax rates increase the probability of a transition to the informal sector for women
and low-income workers, driven by a strong effect for low-income women. Taxes
30We split the sample using gross income of the past period.
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seem to have little effect on the informal sector choice of either men or high income
workers. In this sections we test the robustness of these findings to other charac-
teristics of workers, such as their age, education level or rural/urban location.
Low-income women. First consider the sample of lower income women, which
are the group most sensitive to changes in average tax rates in the results above.
In Table 1.8 the first column restates the results from Table 1.7 above (for compar-
ison). In Columns 2 and 3 we see that the results are robust to splitting the sample
by years of schooling (with a split at the mean of 10 years). Surprisingly, women
with more years of schooling are more sensitive to tax rates, though standard errors
are also wider so the results should be interpreted with caution. Columns (4) and
(5) split the sample by age at the sample mean of 38 years. Here older women seem
to be more sensitive to taxes than younger women. This may also be explained
by the literature (Maloney, 2004; Correia, 2001; Chant, 1991; Levy, 2008) which
mentions that women may be more flexible, and balance their jobs and families if
they work for themselves rather than being employees. Although the coefficient for
younger women is insignificant, the point estimates (of unity) is still quite large
and so the insignificant coefficient reflects wider standard errors rather than a co-
efficient of zero. Results are similar for the urban/rural split in Columns 6 and 7.
The estimated coefficient of 2.5 (significant at the 1 percent level) is the largest es-
timated in this paper, suggesting poor women in rural areas are the most sensitive
to tax rates — probably because they can transition to informal working in the
agricultural sector.31As before, the estimated coefficient of unity in urban areas is
not small, and insignificance is just driven by wide standard errors.
Women only. Table 1.9 broadens the sample to just including all women.
As in low-income women sample, the most sensitive population are for women in
rural areas (many of whom are probably of lower income). Many of the other
31For rural areas we consider smaller municipalities which are not considered as the main
cities in each state. For a complete definition see http://www.inegi.org.mx/est/contenidos/
Proyectos/encuestas/hogares/regulares/enoe/doc/Con_basedat2013.pdf
41
Table 1.8: Robustness: heterogeneity for sample of low-income women
Informal - Lag(4) Informal
Women with less than MXN 62,400: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax 1.47*** 1.41** 2.24** 0.97 2.10** 0.96 2.46***
(0.54) (0.66) (1.13) (0.66) (1.00) (0.78) (0.92)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.011*** 0.0083* 0.019* 0.019*** 0.0063 0.014*** 0.0094
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.011) (0.0068) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0067)
Married 0.0060** 0.0022 0.011*** 0.021*** -0.00067 0.0015 0.013**
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0051)
Age 0.40*** 0.25** 0.73*** 0.43*** 0.34**
(0.072) (0.10) (0.18) (0.088) (0.14)
Age squared -0.0036*** -0.0020 -0.0079*** -0.0039*** -0.0031*
(0.00091) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0011) (0.0018)
First stage coefficient 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.75*** 0.67***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.040) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) (0.031)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 71,428 47,338 24,090 38,741 32,687 45,558 25,870
F-statistic 1649.29 999.73 321.80 897.15 510.47 1057.30 464.39
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter × year fixed
effects and city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
estimates are insignificant (or borderline insignificant) with cuts of the data (by
age or education level), which in part reflects larger standard errors but also reflects
a small estimated effect for women who are of high income.
We want to note that our results mainly address changes from formal to informal
sector jobs. However workers may also leave the labor force when there are increases
in taxes. As our results indicate the effect of changes in taxes is more sensitive for
women, we also test if changes in taxes increase the probability of leaving the labor
force by gender and overall. Table 1.10 shows that the probability of leaving the
labor force given an increase in taxes is not significant for either women or men.
Low income only. Table 1.11 cuts the sample by schooling, age and rural/ur-
ban for the population of low income workers (both genders). The striking fact is
the lack of heterogeneity of point estimates: for example the estimated coefficient
is around unity for high and low education workers, and for those in both rural and
urban areas — with significance (or lack thereof) being determined by the size of
standard errors. The exception is age, where older workers are much more sensitive
(in terms of point estimates and significance) to tax rates than younger workers.
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Table 1.9: Robustness: heterogeneity for women only sample
Informal - Lag(4) Informal
Women: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All women <10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax 0.74** 0.87 0.56 0.54 1.08* 0.37 1.55**
(0.31) (0.53) (0.47) (0.43) (0.57) (0.41) (0.63)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.033*** 0.024*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.039***
(0.0043) (0.0066) (0.0082) (0.0068) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0070)
Married 0.0053*** 0.0032 0.0062** 0.019*** -0.00051 0.0018 0.012***
(0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0041)
Age 0.43*** 0.29*** 0.71*** 0.45*** 0.40***
(0.065) (0.094) (0.12) (0.075) (0.13)
Age squared -0.0041*** -0.0023** -0.0076*** -0.0042*** -0.0038**
(0.00083) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.00096) (0.0016)
First stage coefficient 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.94*** 0.81*** 0.95*** 0.76***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030)
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 102,304 51,724 50,580 52,656 49,648 67,809 34,495
F-statistic 1790.03 1348.88 545.98 1342.59 665.03 1361.42 621.16
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects
and city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
Table 1.10: Robustness: heterogeneity with unemployment as dependent
variable
Unemployment - Lag(4) Unemployment
Full sample Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
2SLS 2SLS with controls OLS Women 2SLS Women OLS Men 2SLS Men OLS
Change tax -0.77 -3.93 0.37 -11.4 1.01 -1.73 1.87
(0.74) (3.58) (0.92) (6.98) (1.19) (3.51) (1.50)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.37*** 0.11* 0.18*** 0.021 0.18*** 0.15** 0.33***
(0.016) (0.058) (0.010) (0.086) (0.014) (0.061) (0.022)
Married -0.027
(0.027)
Age 0.96*** 0.69*** 0.96 -0.78* 0.86*** 0.72*
(0.25) (0.13) (0.71) (0.42) (0.28) (0.36)
Age squared -0.012*** -0.0084*** -0.0097 0.014** -0.012*** -0.0055
(0.0035) (0.0018) (0.010) (0.0061) (0.0038) (0.0047)
First stage coefficient 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.94*** 0.81*** 0.95*** 0.76***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 12,145 12,145 13,614 3,466 3,859 8,679 30,664
F-statistic 1172.08 19.87 3.67 25.70
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. The OLS results use use the method of Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller
(2008) wherein the null distribution of the t-statistic is estimated by running the model in a series of bootstrap samples to deal with a small number
of clusters and give more robustness to our results. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter × year fixed effects and city fixed
effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.11: Robustness: heterogeneity for sample of all low-income work-
ers
Informal - Lag(4) Informal
Less than MXN 62,400: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<62,400 <10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax 0.95*** 0.94** 0.93 0.58 1.30** 1.01* 0.95
(0.33) (0.40) (0.76) (0.42) (0.63) (0.58) (0.61)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income -0.0014 -0.0054 0.011 0.0099** -0.0075* -0.0035 -0.0021
(0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0075) (0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0041)
Age 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.82*** 0.56*** 0.39***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.12) (0.081) (0.069)
Age squared -0.0049*** -0.0038*** -0.0092*** -0.0058*** -0.0041***
(0.00058) (0.00057) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.00086)
First stage coefficient 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.76*** 0.69*** 0.75*** 0.69***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.024) (0.015) (0.023)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 194,529 143,684 50,845 109,950 84,579 108,043 86,486
F-statistic 2021.68 1587.16 350.09 1749.63 835.52 2433.64 906.24
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects
and city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
Men. Finally, Tables 1.12 and 1.13 corroborate that regardless of education,
age or urban/rural location, an increase in the average tax rates for men or low-
income men does not increase their probability of working in the informal sector.
Table 1.12: An increase in the average tax rate does not affect the prob-
ability of men to work in the informal market
Informal - Lag(4) Informal
Men: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax -0.15 -0.30 -0.27 -0.21 -0.27 0.30 -0.67**
(0.24) (0.34) (0.55) (0.38) (0.43) (0.42) (0.33)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.024*** 0.013* 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.020*** 0.036*** 0.013***
(0.0044) (0.0072) (0.011) (0.0069) (0.0077) (0.0088) (0.0050)
Age 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.46*** 0.44*** 0.39***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.11) (0.088) (0.080)
Age squared -0.0047*** -0.0047*** -0.0051*** -0.0047*** -0.0043***
(0.00068) (0.00065) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.00098)
First stage coefficient 0.96*** 1.02*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.99*** 0.91***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.032)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 197,505 130,990 66,515 105,933 91,572 112,546 84,959
F-statistic 2215.29 1408.02 695.53 1222.85 1299.26 1766.47 782.63
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects
and city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.13: An increase in the average tax rate does not affect the prob-
ability of poor men to work in the informal market
Informal - Lag(4) Informal
Men with less than MXN 62,400: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax 0.53 0.72 -0.66 0.18 0.80 0.99 0.21
(0.48) (0.58) (1.30) (0.63) (0.96) (0.94) (0.70)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income -0.011** -0.013** 0.000059 0.0034 -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.0054
(0.0044) (0.0055) (0.011) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0069) (0.0051)
Age 0.53*** 0.46*** 0.91*** 0.65*** 0.39***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.19) (0.12) (0.078)
Age squared -0.0058*** -0.0050*** -0.011*** -0.0072*** -0.0043***
(0.00070) (0.00068) (0.0024) (0.0015) (0.00098)
First stage coefficient 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.65*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.73*** 0.69***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.059) (0.024) (0.033) (0.029) (0.032)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 123,101 96,346 26,755 71,209 51,892 62,485 60,616
F-statistic 826.35 746.64 123.75 920.78 416.87 646.54 453.88
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects
and city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
1.6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined how changes in the average tax rate in Mexico affect
the decision of an individual to work in the informal vs formal sectors. To answer
this question, we use a rotating panel of Mexican workers collected over a decade,
calculate implied average tax rates based on the tax code for each worker, and run
a regression of individual changes in informality on changes in the average tax rate.
Our methodology relies on changes in legislative tax rates as instrument for changes
in actual average tax rates, and controls for lagged income, individual effects, time
effects, seasonality and a range of demographic, regional and industry-level factors.
Although we find little overall evidence that an increase in the average tax rate
affects transitions to informality overall, we do find that an increase in average
tax rates induces women and low-income workers towards the informal sector. The
results are driven by low-income female workers, with particularly strong results for
those in rural areas. Quantitatively, we find that a 1 percentage point in average
labor tax rates increases the probability that low income women will transition to
informal sector by around 1.5 percentage points. These results suggest that low
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income women might be closest to being indifferent between informal and formal
sector work.
More broadly, the determinants of informality are important because they might
explain why countries like Mexico have experienced such weak productivity growth
(Levy, 2008). Our data suggests that although the static costs of informality are
smaller than expected, the dynamic costs of informality might be much larger
as informal sector workers have slower growth in productivity than formal sector
workers. As results suggest that low-income women are particularly sensitive to
tax rates, there may be scope for measures in the tax system to encourage these
workers back towards formal sector employment.
Appendices
1.A Quarterly transitions between formality and
informality
Table 1.A.1: Quarterly transitions between formality and informality
Change Formalt Informalt
Panel A: Workers status change for full sample
Formalt−1 86.7% 13.3%
Informalt−1 11.7% 88.4%
Panel B: Male Workers status change
Formalt−1 86% 14%
Informalt−1 12.5% 87.5%
Panel C: Female Workers status change
Formalt−1 88.2% 11.8%
Informalt−1 9.9% 90.1%
Panel D: Workers status change with 12 years or less of schooling
Formalt−1 87.9% 12.1%
Informalt−1 13.2% 86.8%
Panel E: Workers status change with 9 years or less of schooling
Formalt−1 89.3% 10.8%
Informalt−1 15.4% 84.6%
1.B Formulas to calculate average tax rates
Tax allowance:
taxal = min(grossinc,min(grossinc ∗ (6/365) ∗ .25,minwage ∗ 15)
+min(grossinc ∗ 15/365),minwage ∗ 30)) (1.9)
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Tax income:
taxcr = taxcredit+ adjfac ∗ (othercredit + extracredit ∗ tax) ∗ (taxinc− llimit)
ifyear = 2006− 2007 (1.10)
taxcr = taxcredit
ifyear = 2008− 2014 (1.11)
Tax paid to government (subtracting credits):
taxpaid = taxinc− taxcr (1.12)
Employees’ social security contributions:
ssc2005 = grossinc ∗ sscrate
+ (abs(grossinc− (3 ∗ 365 ∗minwage))) ∗ sscratesur
ifyear = 2005 (1.13)
ssc2006 = min(grossinc ∗ sscrate,minwage ∗ 25 ∗ 365 ∗ sscrate)
+min(abs(grossinc− (3 ∗ 365 ∗minwage)) ∗ sscratesur,
minwage ∗ (25− 3) ∗ 365 ∗ sscratesur)
+min(grossinc ∗ sscratedli,minwage ∗ 23 ∗ 365 ∗ sscratedli),
ifyear = 2006 (1.14)
ssc2007 = min(grossinc ∗ sscrate,minwage ∗ 25 ∗ 365 ∗ sscrate)
+min(abs(grossinc− (3 ∗ 365 ∗minwage)) ∗ sscratesur,
minwage ∗ (25− 3) ∗ 365 ∗ sscratesur)
+min(grossinc ∗ sscratedli,minwage ∗ 24 ∗ 365 ∗ sscratedli),
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ifyear = 2007 (1.15)
ssc = min(grossinc ∗ sscrate,minwage ∗ 25 ∗ 365 ∗ sscrate)
+min(abs(grossinc− (3 ∗ 365 ∗minwage)) ∗ sscratesur,
minwage ∗ (25− 3) ∗ 365 ∗ sscratesur),
ifyear = 2008− 2014 (1.16)
Central government income tax paid plus employees’ social security con-
tributions:
tgpaid = taxpaid+ ssc (1.17)
bigskip Take-home pay:
earnaf = grossinc− tgpaid (1.18)
Employers’ social security contributions:
sscemp2005 = grossinc ∗ sscempr
+(365∗minwage)∗sscemprmin+(abs(grossinc−(3∗365∗minwage)))∗sscemprsur
ifyear = 2005 (1.19)
sscemp2006 = min(grossinc ∗ sscempr,minwage ∗ 25 ∗ 365 ∗ sscrate)
+ 365 ∗minwage ∗ sscemprmin
+min(abs(grossinc− (3 ∗ 365 ∗minwage)) ∗ sscemprsur,
minwage ∗ (25− 3) ∗ 365 ∗ sscemprsur)
+min(grossinc ∗ sscemprdli,minwage ∗ 23 ∗ 365 ∗ sscemprdli),
ifyear = 2006 (1.20)
sscemp2007 = min(grossinc ∗ sscempr,minwage ∗ 25 ∗ 365 ∗ sscrate)
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+ 365 ∗minwage ∗ sscemprmin
+min(abs(grossinc− (3 ∗ 365 ∗minwage)) ∗ sscemprsur,
minwage ∗ (25− 3) ∗ 365 ∗ sscemprsur)
+min(grossinc ∗ sscemprdli,minwage ∗ 24 ∗ 365 ∗ sscemprdli),
ifyear = 2007 (1.21)
sscemp = min(grossinc ∗ sscempr,minwage ∗ 25 ∗ 365 ∗ sscempr)
+ 365 ∗minwage ∗ sscemprmin
+min(abs(grossinc− (3 ∗ 365 ∗minwage)) ∗ sscemprsur,
minwage ∗ (25− 3) ∗ 365 ∗ sscemprsur),
ifyear = 2008− 2014 (1.22)
Average Income Tax:
taxrateave = (sscemp+ tgpaid)/grossincome (1.23)
1.C Narrative discussion of changes in tax rates
The main changes in tax rates over the period studied depend on the increase in
the minimum wage every year.
• 2005-2006: Main changes include a decrease in the last tax bracket from 30
percent to 29 percent and the inclusion of a ceiling to the salary that is base
for the social security contributions in 2006.
• 2006-2007: Main changes include a decrease in the last tax bracket form 29
percent to 28 percent. The base for social security contributions changed the
ceiling from a base of 23 times the minimum wage to a base of 24 times the
minimum wage.
• 2007-2008: Main changes include an increase in tax brackets from 5 to 8,
and the fiscal subsidy disappeared, keeping only tax credits. The adjustment
factor that accounted for the share of fringe benefits disappeared. The base
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for social security contributions changed the ceiling from a base of 24 times
the minimum wage to a base of 25 times minimum wage.
• 2008-2009: Main change was a decrease of insurance for work injuries of
employees from 2.12 percent to 2.04 percent of worker’s monthly wage.32
• 2009-2010: Main change was a modification on the last 3 brackets of tax
rate. From 19.94 to 21.36 percent; 21.95 to 23.525 percent; and from 28 to
30 percent, respectively.
• 2010-2011: No changes
• 2011-2012: The main change was on insurance for work injuries, which went
from 2.05 to 1.98 percent of worker’s monthly wage.
• 2012-2013: No changes
• 2013-2014: There were 3 new brackets included: 32 percent, 34 percent and
35 percent for high income earners.
32The amount of the work injury fee depends on the risk level in which the company is classified.
The Mexican Institute of Social Security provided a weighted average rate that considers the
economic activities from C to K of the International Standard Classification (Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2011)
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1.D First stage of Two-stage Least Squares Re-
gressions
Table 1.D.1: Main regression results – higher taxes increase informality
for women, but not for men or overall – First Stage
Change tax rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Full sample Full sample Women Men
Change tax (past income) 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.88*** 0.96***
(0.0077) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income -0.0079*** -0.011*** -0.0097*** -0.014***
(0.00041) (0.00046) (0.00043) (0.00062)
Age 0.052*** 0.029*** 0.074***
(0.0029) (0.0057) (0.0038)
Age squared -0.00065*** -0.00039*** -0.00090***
(0.000035) (0.000072) (0.000047)
Married 0.00031**
(0.00015)
Constant 0.087*** 0.11*** 0.095*** 0.13***
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0039) (0.0060)
Industry FE NO YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE NO YES YES YES
City FE NO YES YES YES
Observations 300,425 300,425 102,450 197,975
R-squared 0.220 0.237 0.272 0.231
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown
include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects and city fixed effects. *** is significant at
the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.D.2: Changes in taxes are contributing to increasing informality
specially for the poor – First Stage
Change tax rate
Full sample Women Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income<62,400 Income>62,400 Income<62,400 Income>62,400 Income<62,400 Income>62,400
Change tax (past income) 0.73*** 0.88*** 0.73*** 0.85*** 0.72*** 0.89***
(0.016) (0.046) (0.018) (0.074) (0.025) (0.047)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.00075*** -0.021*** 0.00059** -0.021*** -0.00066* -0.021***
(0.00021) (0.00075) (0.00028) (0.00096) (0.00034) (0.00077)
Married 0.00056*** 0.00062
(0.00012) (0.00039)
Age 0.040*** 0.091*** 0.021*** 0.053** 0.059*** 0.10***
(0.0026) (0.0077) (0.0037) (0.019) (0.0040) (0.0080)
Age squared -0.00048*** -0.0010*** -0.00027*** -0.00057** -0.00069*** -0.0012***
(0.000031) (0.000088) (0.000045) (0.00023) (0.000049) (0.000091)
Constant -0.019*** 0.20*** -0.016*** 0.22*** -0.0078** 0.20***
(0.0022) (0.0083) (0.0030) (0.011) (0.0032) (0.0086)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 194,965 105,460 71,528 30,922 123,437 74,538
R-squared 0.354 0.140 0.425 0.159 0.329 0.136
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter × year fixed effects
and city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
Table 1.D.3: Robustness: heterogeneity for sample of low-income women
– First Stage
Change tax rate
Women with less than MXN 62,400: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax (past income) 0.73*** 0.69*** 0.72*** 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.75*** 0.67***
(0.018) (0.022) (0.040) (0.025) (0.030) (0.023) (0.031)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.00059** -0.0011*** 0.0023*** 0.00098*** 0.00023 0.00073** 0.00023
(0.00028) (0.00032) (0.00039) (0.00029) (0.00039) (0.00032) (0.00038)
Married 0.00056*** 0.00030** 0.00059** 0.0010*** 0.00045*** 0.00044*** 0.00076***
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00023) (0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00017)
Age 0.021*** 0.016*** 0.033*** 0.022*** 0.019***
(0.0037) (0.0030) (0.0090) (0.0050) (0.0048)
Age squared -0.00027*** -0.00018*** -0.00035*** -0.00029*** -0.00022***
(0.000045) (0.000040) (0.00011) (0.000060) (0.000062)
Constant -0.016*** 0.00085 -0.034*** -0.015*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.014***
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0038)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 71,528 47,401 24,127 38,800 32,728 45,624 25,904
R-squared 0.425 0.537 0.295 0.444 0.407 0.410 0.460
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects and city
fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.D.4: Robustness: heterogeneity for women only sample – First
Stage
Change tax rate
Women: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All women <10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax (past income) 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.78*** 0.94*** 0.81*** 0.95*** 0.76***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income -0.0097*** -0.0083*** -0.013*** -0.0088*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.0084***
(0.00043) (0.00039) (0.00058) (0.00050) (0.00040) (0.00046) (0.00052)
Married 0.00031** -0.00012 0.00050** 0.00091*** 0.00020 0.00026 0.00038
(0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00023) (0.00017) (0.00020) (0.00018) (0.00028)
Age 0.029*** 0.014*** 0.056*** 0.030*** 0.028***
(0.0057) (0.0040) (0.010) (0.0070) (0.0064)
Age squared -0.00039*** -0.00020*** -0.00061*** -0.00042*** -0.00035***
(0.000072) (0.000053) (0.00013) (0.000088) (0.000081)
Constant 0.095*** 0.081*** 0.13*** 0.093*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.078***
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0055) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0045) (0.0048)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 102,450 51,794 50,656 52,743 49,707 67,907 34,543
R-squared 0.272 0.424 0.208 0.280 0.266 0.260 0.304
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects and city
fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
Table 1.D.5: Robustness: heterogeneity for sample of all low-income
workers – First Stage
Change tax rate
Less than MXN 62,400: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<62,400 <10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax (past income) 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.76*** 0.69*** 0.75*** 0.69***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.037) (0.018) (0.024) (0.015) (0.023)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income 0.00075*** -0.00029 0.0025*** 0.0011*** 0.00086*** 0.0011*** 0.00034
(0.00021) (0.00022) (0.00042) (0.00027) (0.00022) (0.00030) (0.00029)
Age 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.029***
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0029)
Age squared -0.00048*** -0.00036*** -0.00066*** -0.00061*** -0.00031***
(0.000031) (0.000031) (0.000065) (0.000042) (0.000035)
Constant -0.019*** -0.0072*** -0.041*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.024*** -0.014***
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0044) (0.0028) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0027)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 194,965 144,015 50,950 110,172 84,793 108,294 86,671
R-squared 0.354 0.406 0.258 0.374 0.329 0.332 0.391
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter× year fixed effects and city
fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 1.D.6: An increase in the average tax rate does not affect the
probability of men to work in the informal market – First stage
Change tax rate
Men: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax (past income) 0.96*** 1.02*** 0.82*** 0.96*** 0.94*** 0.99*** 0.91***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.032)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.011***
(0.00062) (0.00077) (0.00060) (0.00066) (0.00062) (0.00072) (0.00061)
Age 0.064*** 0.053*** 0.087*** 0.083*** 0.045***
(0.0036) (0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0044) (0.0053)
Age squared -0.00079*** -0.00066*** -0.00097*** -0.0010*** -0.00055***
(0.000045) (0.000056) (0.00010) (0.000055) (0.000062)
Married 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0016*** 0.0023*** 0.0016*** 0.0022*** 0.00069***
(0.00016) (0.00017) (0.00029) (0.00020) (0.00022) (0.00021) (0.00019)
Constant 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.10***
(0.0062) (0.0076) (0.0061) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0075) (0.0060)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 197,975 131,335 66,640 106,157 91,818 112,826 85,149
R-squared 0.231 0.270 0.195 0.241 0.220 0.224 0.252
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter × year fixed effects and
city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
Table 1.D.7: An increase in the average tax rate does not affect the
probability of low income men to work in the informal market – First
Stage
Change tax rate
Men with less than MXN 62,400: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
<10 years in school >10 years in school <38 years >38 years Urban Rural
Change tax (past income) 0.72*** 0.74*** 0.65*** 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.73*** 0.69***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.059) (0.024) (0.033) (0.029) (0.032)
Lag(4) ln Gross Income -0.00066* -0.0015*** 0.0011* 0.000040 -0.00036 -0.0013*** -0.00032
(0.00034) (0.00035) (0.00063) (0.00040) (0.00033) (0.00048) (0.00039)
Age 0.059*** 0.049*** 0.092*** 0.084*** 0.034***
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0074) (0.0058) (0.0039)
Age squared -0.00069*** -0.00056*** -0.0011*** -0.0010*** -0.00038***
(0.000049) (0.000050) (0.000100) (0.000072) (0.000047)
Constant -0.0078** 0.0022 -0.032*** -0.0035 -0.000096 -0.0054 -0.0081**
(0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0067) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0035)
(0.024) (0.027) (0.058) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028) (0.033)
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter × Y ear FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
City FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 123,437 96,614 26,823 71,372 52,065 62,670 60,767
R-squared 0.329 0.367 0.239 0.348 0.302 0.301 0.369
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include industry fixed effects, quarter × year fixed effects and
city fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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1.E Definitions of formal labor by country
Table 1.E.1: Social protection (legalistic) definition of labor formality.
Country A worker is formal if she...
Argentina has the right to a pension when retired
Bolivia (since 2000) is affiliated with AFP (Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones)
Brazil contributes to the Social Security system
Chile is affiliated with any social security system
Colombia (ENH) has the right to a pension when retired
Ecuador (ECV) has the right to a pension when retired
El Salvador is affiliated with any social security system (no information for domestic servants)
Guatemala contributes to the IGSS (Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social)
Mexico (since 2000) has the right to a pension when retired
Nicaragua contributes to the INSS (Insituto Nicaraguense de Seguridad Social)
Paraguay is affiliated with any social security system
Peru (since 1999) is affiliated with any social security system
Uruguay (since 2001) has the right to a pension when retired
Venezuela (2000-2003) has the right to social benefits
Source: CEDLAC and Gasparini and Tornarolli (2007).
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Chapter 2
Latin American Aid Patterns:
Democratic Political Regimes and
US domestic Politics
Abstract
Is aid provision to Latin America different from the rest of the world? If so,
why? In this paper we show how patterns of US foreign aid to Latin America
not only differ from aid allocation observed elsewhere but it does so in manners
that can potentially enhance current theories of aid provision. By using panel data
on US aid, characteristics of recipient countries, and the economic views of US
administrations from 1946 to 2001, we find that while political institutions and
events in recipient countries greatly influence US aid allocations, the ideological
orientation of US administrations can explain part of the divergent patterns of aid
towards Latin America. Specifically, we find that while US liberal governments
supported autocracies in Latin America, conservatives provided aid to countries
with better democratic systems in the region. This finding calls for the inclusion
of donor’s domestic politics to account for unexplained variance in aid provision,
which could influence aid allocation patterns to certain regions.
0Co-author: Jenny Guardado (email: jgr45@georgetown.edu)
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2.1 Introduction
Are aid allocations to Latin America systematically “different” from the rest of the
world? If so, why? In this paper we show how the pattern of US foreign aid to Latin
America not only differ from patterns observed elsewhere but it does so in manners
that could enrich current theories of aid provision. Based on the model developed by
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009), we
argue how this model, as applied to Latin America, can be enhanced by considering
US domestic politics and not only its institutional framework. In particular, we
build on Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2009) empirical analysis by adding a measure of ideological orientation. According
to the authors, aid provision serves as a mechanism to obtain policies desirable
to democracies in exchange for transfers to improve the survival of leaders from
autocracies. As a result, a large determinant of aid is the democratic institutions
of the recipient country, or the number of people whose support is necessary to
keep the leader in office.
Yet, recent findings have shown how the ideological orientation of donor coun-
tries can explain foreign aid allocations (Milner and D. Tingley, 2010; Breuning,
1995; Fleck and Kilby, 2010; Goldstein and Moss, 2005). That is, whether govern-
ments are economically conservative or liberal influences the amount of aid given
and the preferred recipients of such aid. Moreover, the ideological orientation of
donor countries also influences the choice among different types of foreign policy
available, such as economic aid or trade policies (Milner and D. Tingley, 2010).
Therefore, ideology has been shown to play a substantial role in foreign policy.
In this paper we incorporate the literature on ideological orientation to the
framework of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) and Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith (2009). As explained in that model, the leaders of donor countries must see
in its benefit the policy concessions obtained via aid. However, what is perceived
as “beneficial” may vary from government to government within the same “institu-
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tional” framework. For instance, leftist governments can gain supporters at home
by providing large amounts of aid to developing countries in exchange for demo-
cratic progress, while conservatives might perceive aid to be ineffectual and rather
support a broader trade policy to open markets for their domestic constituency’s
export products. In either case, ideological views might affect the desirability of
aid versus other policy tools and explain the amount of aid given. Finally, among
other goals, the paper provides further evidence1 of how ideology explains US aid
behavior towards Latin America.
This paper uses country panel data from various sources to analyze the patterns
of aid allocation towards Latin America and the rest of the world. Three main
findings are worth noticing: First, US aid provision to Latin America does follow a
different pattern from that of the rest of the world. After controlling for numerous
political, economic and geographical factors and contrary to popular explanations,
it appears that the US did not always use aid as a transfer to autocracies in exchange
for policy concessions in the region. However, with respect to the rest of the world,
aid appears to be directed to more democratic countries, consistent with the results
in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007).
Second, we find that donor characteristics, such as the ideology of the US gov-
ernment, influenced the extent to which foreign aid was used to obtain policy
concessions from Latin American countries in the 1946-2001 period. More interest-
ingly, the ideology of the US government does not explain much of US aid provision
to the rest of world but it does to Latin America. In addition, CIA interventions
do not affect the amount of aid given to Latin American countries.
Our third finding shows that ideology matters for aid provision to Latin Amer-
ica. Conservative parties in the US increased the amount of aid provided to more
democratic governments in the region. This finding contrasts with that for the rest
of the world, where US ideology does not seem to have any effect on the amount
1By refining the analysis done in (Milner and D. Tingley, 2010) and Dustin Tingley (2010) to
the context of Latin America and comparing it to the rest of the world.
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of aid provision or on the decision to provide aid.
In this paper we show that features related to the political institutions of the
recipient country (e.g. democracies) are important for Latin America. After con-
trolling for changes in US domestic politics, particularly the orientation of the
ruling party, such features can explain changes towards Latin American countries
but less so to the rest of the world.
The paper adds to the current literature in three ways. First, most studies on
US policy focus on US policy towards Latin America without contrasting with what
is the norm in the rest of the world. Rather, US policy towards Latin America is
assumed to be different as the sole justification of a regional approach. However,
without a contrast of how aid is allocated elsewhere and controlling for multiple
factors is hard to justify such approach. In this paper, we do not assume that
Latin America is different a priori, but rather show with evidence the contrast in
aid provision to the region with the patterns observed in the rest of the world.
Second, studies claim there exists an influence of US ideological orientation on
foreign aid (Milner and D. Tingley, 2010). Yet, these have not been systematically
tested within a broader model of aid provision. Moreover, these models have not
looked at their regional applicability, especially to Latin America. The inclusion
of ideological orientations would provide a more nuanced view to the more recent
models of aid provision (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007 and Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Results show that in some cases US ideology does
matter, especially towards a region with high historical salience to the US such as
Latin America. Future research will look into why the region as a whole warrants
a different treatment, while in this paper we look solely at which factors mattered
most from the US perspective and controlling for country (not regional) specific
factors.
Finally, Berger et al. (2013) claim that CIA interventions led to an increase in
foreign aid from the US. They look at the value of US economic and military aid
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received by each country, and test whether CIA interventions led to an increase in
US foreign aid. Following their specification we find that for Latin America, CIA
interventions are not relevant for the amount of aid or the probability of receiving
aid, while for the rest of the world, it seems that it is a determinant of aid provision
from the US. Our results confirm that Latin America has been a region that the US
has treated differently from the rest of the world in terms of aid provision, where
ideology of US political parties and political regimes of receiving countries are more
important in the determination of how much aid is provided to the region.
The study has a regional outlook to unravel variables that might be overlooked
in a cross-country analysis. For instance, it is well known that the strategic interest
of the US in Egypt and Israel to ensure stability in the Middle East has been
followed by a large amount of aid to both countries. However, Figure 2.1 shows a
particular pattern of aid allocation to Latin America in which the levels of economic
aid have actually followed an upward slope while in the rest of the world aid has
been declining.2 For instance, prior to the oil crisis (the height of US aid) Latin
America was receiving an amount of aid similar in quantity to that of the rest
of the world combined. Yet, after 1973 Latin America seems to be following a
downward slope similar to the rest of the world. In contrast, Figure 2.2 exhibits
the pattern of military aid towards Latin America, which has seen a similar trend
just as elsewhere.
2.2 Literature Review
The role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy is a well-established fact.
The type of aid, amount, and recipients are said to be influenced by an array of
geopolitical and strategic factors in both donor and recipient countries. Explana-
tions based on features of the international arena argue that foreign aid allocations
2Sub-Saharan Africa is the only other region that shows a different pattern compared to the
rest of the world. Our analysis will only focus in Latin America
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Figure 2.1: Economic Aid (1946-2001)
(a) Latin America Economic Aid (b) East Asia and Pacific Economic Aid
(c) Europe and Central Asia Economic Aid (d) Sub-Saharan Africa
(e) Middel East and North Africa Eco-
nomic Aid) (f) South Asia Economic Aid
would be primarily driven by security considerations, especially for hegemonic coun-
tries like the US. In such cases, foreign aid (especially military aid) might reflect
security driven relations such as alliances (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981). In contrast,
other explanations emphasize the importance of economic goals, specifically trade,
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Figure 2.2: Military Aid Latin America and the World: 1946-2001
to account for the variation in aid provision. Export groups from donor countries
might benefit from additional markets to offer their products, while import groups
and governments of recipient countries might also benefit from an increased amount
of trade by obtaining higher revenue from tariffs. Therefore, donor governments
may be pressured to use aid to obtain trade policy concessions from certain coun-
tries (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007) or simply to reward major trading
partners (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe, 1998).
Others argue that foreign aid aims to achieve convergence in ideological terms
between donors and recipients. In the case of the US, the implication is that aid is
given for the promotion of democracy and human rights, which during the cold war
was perceived as an anti-communist goal (Packenham, 1973). The promotion of
democracy and human rights also had a security aspect, since it would help defuse
conflict with other democracies (Maoz and Russett, 1993). Moreover, empirical
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evidence supports the “promotion” of democracy effect. For instance, Alesina and
Dollar (2000) find that countries going through a democratization episode receive
an immediate increase in aid. Also, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) observe
that once aid is given to autocratic institutions, further increases in democratization
lead to increases in foreign aid allocation. Yet, the authors also find that other
political and strategic considerations play a role in explaining US aid allocation;
international donors are influenced by policy considerations, past colonial history
and prevailing economic conditions of the recipient countries.
A drawback with empirical studies on aid provision is the lack of a general
explanation of why the US would target aid to improve democracy and trade open-
ness and why the recipient countries would accept. The exception is Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2007), who focus on the incentives of both donor and recipi-
ent countries and argue that aid allocation is given to regimes colloquially known
as “rigged electoral autocracies”. The reason is that autocracies would reduce the
costs of obtaining a policy concession from the recipient state, while the politics of
the donor country benefit in terms of policy concessions from the recipient.
The difficulty with the Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) and Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2009) model is that “institutions”, while explaining a lot of
the observed variation, does not account for the “preferences” or ideological ori-
entation of the group in power. Such preferences are important, considering they
influence both the decision to choose aid as a policy (instead of trade, for example)
and the required “concessions” from recipient countries. Yet, the empirical evidence
of the effect of ideology on foreign aid allocations to the World is mixed at best
(Breuning, 1995). Some studies have found a role for ideology when looking at
certain regions. For instance, (Goldstein and Moss, 2005) find that Republican
governments provided more aid to Africa than Democrats did. Thus suggesting
an important role of ideology on regional allocations. Some authors argue that
the reasons of such differences lie in that conservative governments are driven by
67
more commercial interests (e.g. broadening trade) while liberal governments tend
to allocate aid based on development concerns (Fleck and Kilby, 2010). There-
fore, we should observe a larger emphasis on the resources and the amount of
trade under different US administrations. In this paper we incorporate ideological
considerations to enhance the explanatory power of the empirical model.
Among the studies looking at US - Latin America relations, foreign aid is fre-
quently addressed within the framework of human rights promotion. Among the
noteworthy studies of the region are: First, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) who
revisit the claim that US foreign aid tended to reward human right violators and
punish those countries with a good record. In their view, human rights consider-
ations have been increasingly important in bilateral aid allocations to the region
since the mid 1970s. Yet, this finding has been challenged by McCormick and
Mitchell (1988) who argue that the relationship is non-existent once accounting
for some of the countries’ measures of human rights violations. Finally, Meernik,
Krueger, and Poe (1998) revisit the whole impact of human rights and find that
although human rights concerns were not the major factor, they did play a role in
accounting for aid allocation. They argue that the increasing emphasis on human
rights protection has been driven by the influence of US Congress rather than by
security concerns of the US President. A well known example is that of aid sup-
port directed to the Nicaraguan Contras and Angolan UNITA promoted by the US
President which Congress later amended (Lagon, 1992). Thus, the role of US aid
in promoting (or hindering) human rights remains an open question.
A related issue is the role played by the US in the rise of authoritarianism in
Latin America via the support of military juntas during the 1960s and 1970s. Muller
(1985) argues that the breakdown of democracy in the Third World (hence Latin
America) is a by-product of the competition between the US and Soviet Union,
in which military aid, rise of leftist forces and anti-communist policy hindered
democracy in certain regions. Based on this claim, Sanchez (2003) finds that the
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US provided military assistance to military governments friendly to US interests,
thus contributing to the breakdown of democracy in the region. Yet, the latter
study only focuses on military aid, therefore excluding the role of economic aid as
well as more rigorous tests assessing the impact of military juntas by controlling for
geographical, economic and political factors. Therefore, we analyze the impact of
military aid on the government regime to see whether the correlation found holds
once controlling for alternative accounts.
Finally, a different strand of the literature looks at whether the US provided a
larger amount of military assistance to countries facing a strong leftist insurgent
threat as was the case in many Latin American countries. This policy is the so
called “Reagan Doctrine” which explicitly aided anti-communist guerrillas in the
Third World as in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola and Cambodia (Lagon, 1992).
Yet, such approach might not only be limited to Reagan, since the US provided aid
to military groups to overthrow the Arbenz government in Guatemala (1954) and
invade Cuba in 1961. Therefore, it is possible that this policy might have started
well before the Reagan administration and it is based on the cold war constraints
of not being able to directly challenge the Soviet Union (Lagon, 1992). Throughout
the analysis we include a control for the possibility that the ideological orientation
of certain presidents might matter more than others (e.g. the Reagan period).
Beyond geographical variation in US patterns of aid allocation, the literature
has also recognized variation across time in US aid policies. In this paper we will
argue not only that there is geographic variation in terms of aid allocation policy
in the world, as seen in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. We attempt to explain divergent
patterns towards Latin America, but also clarify misconceptions in US foreign
policy (as pertaining aid) to the region. In sum, to the best of our knowledge there
is no systematic study of US-Latin America relations which has directly addressed
the issue of US ideological orientation on aid provision.
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2.3 Data
The data utilized in this paper was gathered from four main sources: Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2007), Milner and D. Tingley (2010), Berger et al. (2013)
and the COW trade dataset.
Aid: The main dependent variable in this study is the logarithm of economic
and military aid (lnEaid and lnMaid) provided to Latin America and the World
in constant (1996) U.S. dollars as reported by the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) from 1946 to 2001. However, unlike Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2007) we conduct a separate analysis to economic and military aid
but use total economic aid (lnTaid) as a robustness check. In addition to the
amount of aid given, the analysis also accounts for the possibility of receiving any
amount of aid: (Eaid,Maid, Taid) Economic, Military and Total aid, respectively.
Another robustness check comes from the OECD/DAC database on aid commit-
ments. Specifically, we look at total aid commitments including both bilateral and
multilateral aid.3
Political Variables: Coalition size (W ) is an index between 0 and 1 with
higher numbers measuring the degree to which a leader is bound by the ruling
coalition. The selectorate size (eS) index goes from 0 to 1 and measures the
proportion of people with a potential influence over the decision of who is going to
be the leader. Following Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) the selectorate size
is reparamatrized as S ∗ (1 −W ) to emphasize the importance of selectorate size
within autocracies. Both variables are measured for the period 1946-2001.
The main independent political variable is the US government ideological ori-
entation (Ideology) obtained from Milner and D. Tingley (2010)4 based on the
Comparative Manifestos Project. Their idea was to code the manifestos of politi-
3A drawback from the latter is that the period in which this variable is available goes from
1960-2001.
4Tingley’s (2010) is based on a large number of donors (all developed democracies) from which
we only focus on the ideological orientation of the US.
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cal parties, in particular the economic orientation of the government in place using
factor analysis to obtain the first dimension of the economic features which then
allows to calculate the place of each party with regression scores.5 These proce-
dures lead to a continuous measure of ideology based on the economic positions
of parties in power. The idea is that aid and trade policy might be as influenced
by the positions of parties within governments as they are by party positions out-
side government (Milner and D. Tingley, 2010). The inclusion of the ideological
variable provides some variation in the degree of consensus and policy preferences
over time prevailing in US domestic politics which contrasts with the time-invariant
measures of coalition size (or institutions). If we were to observe that changes in
aid provision are not related to the ideological orientation of the US government
then domestic politics by themselves cannot explain variations in aid provision to
Latin America and the World. Finally, a limitation with this variable is that it
is only coded starting 1960, therefore the analysis using these variables explains a
shorter time-period, that of 1960-2001.
We also include as political variable a measure of successful CIA interventions
(from Berger et al., 2013). This indicator equals one if the CIA either installed
a foreign leader or provided covert support for the regime once in power. The
idea is that aid might be influenced by CIA interventions, which in their paper
would lead to an increase in US imports. This variable provides evidence of the
increased political influence arising from CIA interventions in receiving countries,
which could provide a potential explanation of the amount of aid provided or the
probability of aid provision.
Another political variable relates to the recipient’s domestic politics: the ex-
tent of political unrest based on Bank’s (2012) measure of political conflict as
a weighted measure of different conflict instances such as assassinations, strikes,
guerrilla, purges, riots, revolutions and protests as well as an indicator for civil war
5For more details, consult Milner and D. Tingley (2010).
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presence. Yet, given the political situation of Latin America, we will separately
use the coding of guerrilla instances to add the relative strength of such insur-
gency movements. Finally, we use Bueno de Mesquita (1981) measure of alignment
with the United States based on security alliance portfolios (tau). As suggested by
the literature, security concerns might be driving the provision of aid during the
cold-war period: more aid given to “allies” than otherwise.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics for Latin America and the World
Rest of the World Latin America
Variable Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
lnEconomicaid (ln US $ constant) 9.972 3,443 9.558 1,228
(2.111) (1.909)
Economicaid (US $ constant ) 0.472 7,294 0.663 1,853
(0.499) (0.473)
US intervention (Dummy 0-1-CIA successful interv.) 0.159 4,259 0.363 1,071
(0.365) (0.481)
Political Regime (Index (autocratic)0-1(democratic)) 0.549 6,725 0.579 1,755
(0.293) (0.246)
Ideology (Index (liberal)0-10(conservative)) 5.677 5,453 5.677 1,384
(0.366) (0.366)
W ∗ Ideology 3.104 5,159 3.379 1,320
(1.732) (1.515)
W ∗ Intervention 0.063 4,240 0.148 1,071
(0.182) (0.244)
Selectorate size (Index 0-1: proportion people potential influence) 0.299 5,417 0.296 1,400
(0.272) (0.227)
Share of government GDP (US$ constant) 12.897 4,163 12.42 1,306
(1.894) (1.748)
Ln per capita Income (US$ constant) 7.644 4,620 7.999 999
(1.096) (0.574)
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Economic variables: The two most important economic variables to account
for in this paper are the resources of the recipient and donor countries as well as the
amount and direction of trade between both countries. For the latter we use COW
trade data which was obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. We
specifically use the flow of exports (USexports) from the US to the world as well
as the flow of imports (USimports) into the US. This measure is an improvement
over a combined measure of exports and imports, since foreign aid can be used
to purchase imports creating simultaneity problems. Following Meernik, Krueger,
and Poe (1998) we use the value of US imports from each country (or the amount
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of exports to the US).
As a robustness check we also use the logarithm of bilateral trade between
two countries in 1996 US constant dollars. To measure the level of resources of
recipient countries we follow Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) and use the share
of government GDP multiplied by the lagged logarithm of GDP of the recipient
country (RBt−1). Similarly, the level of resources for the donor country is measured
as the share of GDP (RA) multiplied by US GDP. Following Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2007) we also include the squared version of RB to reflect the non-
monotonicity anticipated in the effect of RB. Since the term RB already includes
per capita income and population, which belong to the econometric specification
in their own right (as a control for poverty and humanitarian need), we exclude
them from our specification and only keep RB and RB2. All economic variables
are available from 1946 to 2001.
For the US, the salience of the policy concession sought from Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith (2007) is measured with three indicators: distance, population, and
colony. distance is estimated as the logarithm of the distance in miles between each
prospective recipient’s and each prospective OECD donor’s capital city. population
is measured as the logarithm of the prospective recipient countries population in
millions as reported by Penn World Tables. colony is a dummy variable coded as 1
if the potential recipient country had been a colony of the prospective donor. The
general idea is that policy concessions from geographically closer, more populous
countries are valued more than comparable concessions from small distant coun-
tries. Similarly, former colonies hold higher salience for donors than do states with
which they had no special prior relationship.
The prediction is that the role of institutions, resources, CIA interventions, and
policy salience should not be different in Latin America. However, as already seen
in the introduction, different patterns of US aid to Latin America are noticeable.
If such variation can be explained with institutional variables in the way predicted
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by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) there is stronger evidence for their model.
If not, other hypotheses might have some explanatory power in Latin America
than in the rest of the world in which case an alternative hypothesis will be tested
following the literature. Although this runs against Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2007) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) it does mean there are special
circumstances which make the predictions of their model less evident. Among
these “special circumstances” we particularly account for the role ideology plays in
explaining the results observed in Latin America, as noticed by Dunning (2004) as
well as the role of CIA interventions as shown in Berger et al. (2013). Also, it is
possible that a confounder factor, such as guerrilla warfare, might be explaining
the results observed in the region, thus we carefully look at this possibility.
2.4 Methodology
To explore these hypotheses, we look at aid provision patterns from 1946 to 2001.
The analysis can then elucidate to what extent are democratic institutions6 differ-
ent across time and different geographic regions. Below we carry out two sets of
estimations: one uses a fixed effects model for all US aid recipients between 1946
and 2001 and the other looks at the probability of aid provision. The fixed effects
model can be written as:
lnAidit = αi + βW + δUSIntervt + λW ∗ Ideo+Xit−1 +Mit + γt + εit (2.1)
where i is the country, t is the year,W is the type of political regime (1=democracy,
0=autocracy), USInterventiont is an indicator variable that equals one if the CIA
either installed a foreign leader or provided covert support for the regime in country
i at time t; αi are country fixed effects; γt are time fixed effects; W ∗ Ideo is the
type of political regime multiplied by the score of US economic ideology prevailing
6As in the Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) model.
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in year t (conservative or liberal); lnAid is the amount of aid given, X is a vector
of explanatory variables lagged by one year (e.g. recipient resources), and M are
explanatory variables not lagged.
This model has the purpose of looking at whether the levels of the explanatory
variables are correlated with the level of the dependent variable controlling for
inherent country heterogeneity. Also, the inclusion of fixed effects allows for trends
in aid to vary from country to country and controls for omitted variable bias.
Yet, looking at within country variation precludes the analysis the comparison
of countries who do not receive any aid at all. Therefore, we also estimate the
probability of any amount of aid being given Pr(aid = 1):
Pr(Aidit = 1) = α+βW + δUSIntervt +λW ∗ Ideo+Xit−1 +Mit +γt + εit (2.2)
where all explanatory variables are defined as mentioned above. The coefficient
of interest in both cases is β, which according to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
(2007) should be negative in Equation 2.1 and positive in Equation 2.2.
In addition to the models estimated, the samples observe patterns overlooked
in cross-country analysis. The samples used will be specified in every table.
2.5 Results
The mechanism proposed by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) highlights the
role of institutions, the importance of policy and the resources of the recipient
state as determinants of aid. Such explanation clearly differs from the altruistic
motivations argued by others (Lumsdaine, 1993). Moreover, the authors provide a
coherent explanation as to why we should observe aid giving behavior and in what
amount, which is an improvement on previous literature. However, it appears that
this mechanism better explains some regions than others. Table 2.2 (below) shows
Model 1 and Model 4 of Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) Tables 1 and 4,
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including also CIA interventions from the US.
The dependent variable of the first two columns is the amount of aid given
to the world and to Latin America in particular (when we multiply the effect
by the region), while columns (3) and (4) have as a dependent variable a binary
outcome (aid or no aid) and it uses a logit model.7 To classify countries into regions
we followed the World Bank classification (see Appendix 2.B for classification).
For reasons of space we only present and discuss the main independent variables
discussed in the previous sections (political and economic).8
Table 2.2: Aid Provision to Latin America and the World: 1946-2001
lnEconomicAid Pr(aid)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US intervention (CIA intervention dummy) 0.899*** 0.212**
(0.272) (0.087)
USintervention ∗ LAC (Dummy) -0.606 -0.142
(0.417) (0.097)
Political Regime (W ) (Index 0-1 democratic) 0.506 0.640* -0.023 0.021
(0.398) (0.374) (0.070) (0.075)
PoliticalRegime ∗ LAC 0.165 0.166 -0.036 -0.043
(0.551) (0.532) (0.077) (0.086)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 influence) -0.052 -0.098 -0.020 -0.034
(0.228) (0.218) (0.036) (0.036)
Share of government GDP (RB) 4.046*** 4.061*** 0.048 0.027
(0.895) (0.870) (0.207) (0.198)
RB2 -0.188*** -0.187*** -0.006 -0.005
(0.036) (0.035) (0.008) (0.007)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,525 2,525 3,536 3,536
R-squared 0.169 0.178 0.098 0.113
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Civil war, Soviet Influence, amount of trade.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant
at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
Columns (1) and (2) indicate that similarly to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith’s
(2007) results, the overall patterns of the amount of aid given to the world are
not significant. The probability of receiving economic aid is not granted differently
7The results are also robust to other binary outcomes models (e.g. probit).
8Complete results are available upon request.
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to governments with democracies than to less democratic governments, even after
excluding Latin America. However, as noticed in Columns (2) and (4), with the
inclusion of CIA interventions, the type of political regime has an effect for the
world, although not for Latin America. That is, more democratic countries receive
more aid.
For military aid (see Appendix Table 2.A.1) results are similar to Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2007), where more aid is given to more autocratic govern-
ments in Latin America, while for the rest of the world, military aid is given to
more democratic countries. The probability of receiving aid is only significant for
Latin America, with a positive coefficient, while for the rest of the world is not
significant.
An alternative is that US aid policy not only varied geographically but also by
CIA interventions (as Berger et al., 2013 provide for the world). Similar to Berger
et al. (2013) findings, we also show that the amount of aid increased following CIA
interventions for the world, however this is not the case for Latin America, where
at most we can say that the coefficient is not different from zero.
So far, we have just established regional differences in US aid allocation, yet
the implications are potentially important: First, these results show that there are
certain regions for which the exchange of aid-for-policy concessions for dictatorships
are more applicable than others. Thus, the US may not always target dictatorships
to pursue its preferred policies, at least in Latin America. Second, this result seems
peculiar to Latin America since for other regions in the sample (e.g. Sub-Saharan
Africa), when able to be consistently estimated, there is no difference.9
In the next section we analyze in depth two factors which would, in theory,
enhance the reliance of the US on autocratic governments to pursue its policy aims.
First, the possibility that throughout the period, the ideological orientation of US
9Results for Sub-Saharan Africa suggest no effect of the political regime. In the Middle East,
South Asia and East Asia, the lack of enough observations prevents us from drawing any definite
conclusion. Although alternative models could be estimated for which enough observations exist,
the lack of all the controls would make the results less comparable across specifications.
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administrations and CIA interventions would explain the amount of aid and trade
directed towards receiving countries. Second, we will then account for domestic
events (such as Guerrillas and Civil War) that could explain the divergent patterns
observed in Latin America and the rest of the world.
2.5.1 Can US domestic ideology explain Aid policies?
According to the approach by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007), democratic
donors have a higher incentive to engage in policy-for-aid deals. As noticed by the
authors, the problem of testing this claim empirically is that there is little variation
in the donors democratic governments (W ) throughout the period analyzed since
it is already a consolidated democracy. An alternative explanation is that the
temporal shift in foreign aid observed in Latin America is driven by changes in US
domestic politics. For instance, Milner and D. Tingley (2010) show that aid and
trade policy can not always be used as a substitute of the other, even if the foreign
policy goal is the same. The reason is that these policies tend to be supported (and
disliked) by different constituency groups in the US. Therefore, it is not uncommon
to see different US policy instruments to move in different directions even if the
policy goal is similar. Thus, if there is a change in the domestic interests of the US
towards protecting trade then we should see a surge in foreign aid and vice-versa.
Moreover, it has been shown in cross-country regression analysis of donors’ aid
provision that the ideology of the government in turn can affect aid preferences
with right wing governments severely cutting the provision of aid (Milner and
D. Tingley, 2010). Therefore, instead of looking at the political regime of the
donor country, we look at varying levels of support and ideology within the given
institutions for aid levels. The data is collected from Milner and D. Tingley (2010),
from which we use as variables the levels of ideology and their level of support in
US Congress (1960-2001) weighted by voting levels and all other variables that
were included previously.
78
Table 2.3: US Ideology on Aid Provision to Latin America and the World:
1960-2001
lnEconomicAid Pr(aid)
(1) (2)
US intervention 0.969** 0.106**
(0.407) (0.045)
USintervention ∗ LAC -1.245** -0.118*
(0.605) (0.065)
Political Regime (W )(Index 0-1 democratic) 0.572 -0.164
(2.309) (0.218)
PoliticalRegime ∗ LAC -9.080 -0.236
(5.622) (0.490)
Ideology (Index 0-10 conservative) 0.233 0.003
(0.844) (0.027)
Ideology ∗ LAC -1.408** -0.060
(0.620) (0.056)
W ∗ Ideo 0.017 0.025
(0.374) (0.038)
W ∗ Ideo ∗ LAC 1.573 0.040
(0.994) (0.085)
W ∗ Intervention -0.452 0.197***
(1.047) (0.076)
W ∗ Intervention ∗ LAC 1.386 -0.092
(1.180) (0.113)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 influence) 0.081 0.000
(0.208) (0.023)
Share of government GDP (RB) 4.565*** 0.117
(1.164) (0.073)
RB2 -0.210*** -0.010***
(0.048) (0.003)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,137 3,072
R-squared 0.199 0.056
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Civil war, Soviet Influence, amount
of trade, new leader and years in office.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses.
*** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the
10% level.
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Column (1) in Table 2.3 estimates the effect of US partisanship on US economic
aid to the rest of the world, and specifically to Latin America. As noticed, there is
no effect of ideology or political regime on the amount of aid given conditional on
some aid being given to the rest of the world. We find a negative and significant
effect of the ideology on the amount of aid given in Column (1) which includes the
interaction term of Ideology and Latin America (LAC). This result is similar to
Milner and D. Tingley (2010) who finds that a more conservative stance reduces aid
provision in a cross-country analysis of aid-donors, yet, the same data also reveals
that looking into the observed variation in US aid giving cannot be explained in
purely ideological terms.10 Therefore, the results obtained in Column (1) are quite
interesting since we observe how for Latin America, US aid provision has been
partly influenced by the ideological movements in the US which differ from the rest
of world as seen both in Milner and D. Tingley (2010) data and our analysis of
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) and Berger et al. (2013)11
In terms of explaining CIA interventions, we also find differences in the pattern
comparing the rest of the world to Latin America. While our results for the rest of
the world are similar to the ones obtained by Berger et al. (2013), it appears that
CIA interventions in Latin America have the opposite effect. Column (1) suggests
that aid provision to Latin America was influenced by the CIA interventions as
well as the ideological nature of the US government.
By looking at the probability of receiving economic aid, we conclude that the
likelihood of receiving aid does not depend on either the ideology or political regime
in the region. However, CIA interventions in the region do seem to have an effect
in Latin America (see Table 2.3).
However, when we focus on military aid, the amount of aid to the rest of the
10This analysis was conducted with the author’s (Milner and D. Tingley, 2010) own replication
data. Their analysis does not separate between aid given by country, therefore it cannot be
disaggregated to account for Latin America. Once we do so, the results prove to be different from
the overall pattern exhibited.
11To account for the possibility of autocorrelation we include newey-west robust standard errors
in Table 2.A.4 in the Appendix.
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world decreases with more conservative US governments, but has no significant
effect for Latin America. While probability of receiving aid in Latin America
decreases with more conservative US governments (see Appendix Table 2.A.2).
Looking at the descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 in section 2.3 we can see that
ideology levels were around 5.67, with higher values indicating more conservative
stances. This suggests that the presence of a higher level (on average) of conserva-
tive ideology would be associated with a larger provision of aid to Latin America.
Is economic aid also affected by exports? In Table 2.4 we include the
interaction of the ideological variable with the political regime to see how it affects
the amount of aid controlling for US exports to receiving countries. As seen in
Column (1) the positive effect of the interaction (W * Ideology) remains for LAC,
while for the rest of the world remains not significative. Second, we see that aid and
trade follow a inverse relation for Latin America, while for the rest of the world, if
the amount of aid increases, so does the amount of exports. However, US exports
are not associated with the likelihood of giving economic aid for Latin America
(Column (2)).
The results in Table 2.4 complement those presented in Table 2.3 by including
trade as an explanatory variable. We find that a larger amount of aid comes along
with higher access to the US market, in the rest of the world. This finding is
consistent with Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998), who find a positive relationship
between aid and trade, but does not hold for Latin America.
It is also worth noticing how ideology does not have an effect on the amount
of aid for the rest of the world, but is highly significant for Latin America, even
after controlling for US Exports, which points to the robustness of this particular
finding.
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Table 2.4: US Ideology and Trade on Aid Provision to Latin America
and the World: 1960-2001
lnEconomicAid Pr(aid)
(1) (2)
US intervention (Dummy) 1.185*** 0.048
(0.244) (0.046)
USintervention ∗ LAC -1.368*** -0.066
(0.326) (0.064)
Political Regime (W ) (Index 0-1democratic) 0.093 -0.203
(1.468) (0.215)
PoliticalRegime ∗ LAC -10.090*** -0.146
(2.616) (0.482)
Ideology (Index 0-10 conservative) -0.350 -0.023
(0.378) (0.027)
Ideology ∗ LAC -1.052*** -0.041
(0.284) (0.055)
W ∗ Ideo 0.104 0.030
(0.256) (0.037)
W ∗ Ideo ∗ LAC 1.750*** 0.027
(0.457) (0.084)
W ∗ Intervention -0.257 0.335***
(0.459) (0.075)
W ∗ Intervention ∗ LAC 1.041* -0.216*
(0.613) (0.112)
US Exports 0.423*** 0.054***
(0.060) (0.009)
USExports ∗ LAC -0.431*** 0.001
(0.077) (0.015)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 influence) 0.083 -0.011
(0.120) (0.024)
Share of government GDP (RB) 4.315*** 0.083
(0.411) (0.077)
RB2 -0.203*** -0.008***
(0.016) (0.003)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,098 2,930
R-squared 0.224 0.071
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Civil war, Soviet Influence, amount
of trade, new leader and years in office.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses.
*** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the
10% level.
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2.5.2 Alternative Accounts: Guerrillas and Civil Wars
A different explanation to the divergent patterns observed might not be due to
changes in US domestic politics or to changes in the size of its ruling coalitions.
Rather, different aid patterns could be due to domestic events among recipient
countries. That is, the emergence of domestic threats to US interests in autocratic
governments may have induced a switch in US policy which was not present before.
For instance, the so called “Reagan Doctrine” was a response to the emergence of
Soviet-friendly guerrilla movements in the Third World (Lagon, 1992). Therefore, if
Latin America saw a disproportionate emergence of strong pro-communist guerrilla
movements in autocratic countries, then aid provision may have appeared targeted
to autocratic governments when actually it was targeted towards counterinsurgency
efforts.
In this section we test whether aid provision is affected by the presence of
guerrilla forces or civil war. Previously we have followed the specifications used
in Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) and Berger et al. (2013) for the sake of
deriving relevant comparisons thus including the indicator of civil war presence in
the country. Although the presence of civil war is relevant in the world context, in
particular sub-Saharan Africa, its low presence in Latin America might have not
captured the specific type of threat posed to US interests in this region.
Although many of these conflicts are originated by the presence of guerrilla
groups, the lack of full-scale civil wars in the region calls for a more nuanced
definition of conflict for the case. Moreover, in the tables presented previously,
civil war has a small or null effect on the probability of receiving aid, and only in
the specifications in which Latin America is excluded (as expected). A different
case is its influence on exports to the US in which the presence of civil war was
associated with a larger number of exports. The explanation lies in the nature of
US interventions in civil war, since it had a larger emphasis on securing supplies
to the US. In Table 2.5, we do not find an effect of guerrillas on the probability
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of receiving aid (column 2) or on the amount of aid received (column 1) in Latin
America and the world. However, Reagan has a negative and significant effect for
LAC, while for the rest of the world, the effect is not significant.
Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix provides evidence on how the presence of guerrilla
warfare is negatively related to the amount of military aid in the world but has
not significant effect in Latin America. Furthermore, the probability of aid is
not related to the presence of guerrilla in the region. This assertion runs against
Sanchez (2003) arguing that military aid has contributed to democratic breakdown
in the region, via its targeted aid to military juntas in the presence of insurgency
threats.
As mentioned before, the presence of guerrilla threats does not have an effect
on the amount of military aid given, conditional on any aid being given. This
finding runs against the apparent influence of the Reagan Doctrine and the fact
that it might be targeted for counterinsurgency purposes (see Table 2.5). However,
for military aid, the inclusion of a variable accounting for the Reagan presidency
yields a negative result for the amount of military aid given in Latin America and
in the rest of the world, but the probability is only significant for Latin America.
In sum, internal threats are only associated with a larger amount of military aid
in Latin America, but not with economic aid.
Accounting for sample selection bias. Since we show in the previous para-
graphs that the fact of receiving aid is not random, there is a potential for selection
bias. To account for this we also estimate a two step Heckman selection model
(Heckman, 1979). In Table 2.6 we include the main results that include both the
selection equation (Pr(aid)) and the outcome equation (lnEaid).
It is worth noting that we are not relying solely upon the non linearity in the
functional form of the selection equation. Columns (2) and (4) in Table 2.6 include
the exclusion restrictions (USworld and USresources) that provide a more robust
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Table 2.5: Guerrilla Effect on Aid Provision to Latin America and the
World: 1946-2001
lnEconomicAid Pr(Aid)
(1) (2)
US intervention (Dummy) 1.142*** 0.061
(0.242) (0.046)
USintervention ∗ LAC -1.346*** -0.078
(0.326) (0.064)
Political Regime (W ) (Index 0-1 Democratic) 0.332 -0.071
(1.476) (0.217)
PoliticalRegime ∗ LAC -9.144*** -0.316
(2.639) (0.490)
Ideology (Index 0-10 conservative) 0.378 -0.017
(0.610) (0.031)
Ideology ∗ LAC -0.141 -0.070
(0.345) (0.067)
W ∗ Ideo 0.057 0.006
(0.257) (0.038)
W ∗ Ideo ∗ LAC 1.630*** 0.055
(0.461) (0.085)
W ∗ Intervention -0.215 0.308***
(0.462) (0.076)
W ∗ Intervention ∗ LAC 0.848 -0.178
(0.619) (0.114)
Guerrilla 0.015 -0.007
(0.039) (0.007)
Guerrilla ∗ LAC 0.078 0.008
(0.060) (0.012)
Reagan 0.455 0.042*
(0.484) (0.022)
Reagan ∗ LAC -1.475*** -0.006
(0.230) (0.043)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 Influence) 0.030 -0.003
(0.121) (0.024)
Share of government GDP (RB) 4.312*** 0.085
(0.409) (0.075)
RB2 -0.200*** -0.008***
(0.016) (0.003)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2,094 2,957
R-squared 0.204 0.054
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Soviet Influence, amount of trade, new
leader and years in office.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. *** is
significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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identification. According to Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007), the character-
istics of the donor country (US) represent valid exclusion restrictions that allows
us to identify the Heckman model. Our findings in Table 2.6 are consistent with
our main results, which suggest that for Latin America, ideology is an important
factor in determining the amount of aid and the probability of receiving economic
aid in the region. The coefficients show the same signs and are still significant,
which validates our previous results.
Table 2.6: Heckman Model of the Propensity of the US to Provide Aid
to Latin America and the World, 1960-2001
Outcome Equation Selection Equation
World Latin America World Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US intervention (Dummy) 1.091*** -0.383 1.520** -1.229
(0.217) (0.474) (0.649) (1.868)
Political Regime (W ) (Index 0-1 Democratic) 0.559 -12.065*** -2.217 -40.226
(1.310) (4.688) (2.986) (12.297)
W ∗ Ideo 0.011 2.284*** 0.408 6.706
(0.228) (0.817) (0.523) (2.049)
W ∗ Intervention 0.003 0.252 -0.820 4.881
(0.412) (0.869) (0.836) (3.569)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 Influence) 0.009 -0.209 -0.431 5.561
(0.117) (0.504) (0.398) (2.293)
Share of government GDP (RB) 2.960*** 7.466*** -4.344** -16.366
(0.416) (2.699) (1.381) (8.217)
RB2 -0.146*** -0.309*** 0.124* 0.687
(0.017) (0.108) (0.051) (0.350)
USworld 36.915 -837.767
(76.748) (114.021)
USresources 3.482 -148.836
(13.749) (3.960)
Observations 2,290 669 2,290 669
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Soviet Influence, amount of trade.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the 1% level;
** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
2.6 Conclusions
This paper has examined how different factors affect US aid provision to Latin
America and the rest of the World using a detailed longitudinal cross-country anal-
ysis. We present evidence showing that US foreign aid to Latin America follows
a different pattern than the one observed for the rest of the world. Yet, contrary
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to previous studies, we find that the amount of foreign aid allocation to the region
is importantly influenced by the ideology of the United States government rather
than by recipient characteristics such as institutions or internal threats (e.g. guerril-
las). These results are robust to controlling for a variety of alternative hypotheses,
including economic controls as well as differential trends across countries.
We also present evidence on how foreign aid allocations are distributed to other
parts of the world in order to appropriately compare the patterns observed. After
controlling for numerous political, economic and geographical factors, we find that
the US did not always use aid as a transfer to autocracies in exchange for policy
concessions in Latin America. With respect to the rest of the world, aid appears
to be directed to more democratic countries. Such comparison is important in the
case of regional studies since it allows us to not assume any differential policy, but
rather to show with evidence that such differences exist
We find that donor characteristics influence the extent to which foreign aid was
used to obtain policy concessions from Latin America during 1946-2001. Moreover,
the ideology of the US government does not explain much of US aid provision to
the rest of world but it does so to Latin America. In addition, aid provision to the
rest of the world is affected by CIA interventions more than by the type of political
regime in the receiving country, while CIA interventions do not affect the amount
of aid given to Latin American countries.
This paper also calls for a more nuanced view on commonly held beliefs about
US foreign policy towards Latin America. For instance, the alleged militarization
of the region due to US military aid or the use of foreign aid for counterinsurgency
efforts appears unsubstantiated. Rather, US - Latin America relations have seen
that aid is targeted to more democratic institutions under conservative govern-
ments. Therefore, at least some part of the effect observed can be attributed to
the preferences, goals and objectives of US administrations which vary according
to the economic or ideological view of those in power.
Appendices
2.A Results for Military Aid
Table 2.A.1: Military Aid Provision to Latin America and the World:
1946-2001
lnMilitaryAid Pr(MilitaryAid)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US intervention (Dummy) 0.292 0.312***
(0.290) (0.038)
USintervention ∗ LAC 0.430 -0.162***
(0.344) (0.052)
Political Regime (W ) (Index 0-1 Democratic) 0.752*** 0.754** -0.060 0.026
(0.258) (0.295) (0.042) (0.046)
PoliticalRegime ∗ LAC -0.885** -0.560 0.150** 0.206***
(0.375) (0.407) (0.066) (0.070)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 Influence) -0.006 -0.099 0.063** 0.050
(0.176) (0.183) (0.029) (0.030)
Share of government GDP (RB) 4.313*** 4.457*** 0.994*** 1.043***
(0.669) (0.728) (0.081) (0.086)
RB2 -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.041*** -0.043***
(0.024) (0.026) (0.003) (0.003)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,875 1,623 3,929 3,536
R-squared 0.161 0.164 0.233 0.248
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Civil war, Soviet Influence, amount of trade, contiguous
border, common language, GATT participant, regional trade agreement.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant at the
1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.A.2: US Ideology on Military Aid Provision to Latin America
and the World: 1960-2001
lnMilitaryAid Pr(MilitaryAid)
(1) (2)
US intervention (Dummy) 1.480*** 0.305***
(0.424) (0.059)
USintervention ∗ LAC -1.409*** -0.283***
(0.530) (0.084)
Political Regime (W ) (Index 0-1 Democratic) 1.038 1.684***
(2.579) (0.291)
PoliticalRegime ∗ LAC -0.044 -4.256***
(4.388) (0.639)
Ideology (Index 0-10 Conservative) -1.731*** 0.074
(0.580) (0.076)
Ideology ∗ LAC -0.213 -0.679***
(0.496) (0.072)
W ∗ Ideo 0.071 -0.292***
(0.443) (0.051)
W ∗ Ideo ∗ LAC -0.331 0.769***
(0.772) (0.111)
W ∗ Intervention -1.931*** -0.009
(0.733) (0.099)
W ∗ Intervention ∗ LAC 3.042*** 0.185
(0.913) (0.148)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 Influence) -0.078 0.034
(0.193) (0.030)
Share of government GDP (RB) 4.178*** 1.120***
(0.797) (0.095)
RB2 -0.151*** -0.048***
(0.029) (0.004)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,392 3,072
R-squared 0.148 0.252
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Civil war, Soviet Influence, amount of trade,
contiguous border, common language, GATT participant, regional trade agreement.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. *** is
significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.A.3: Guerrilla Effect on Military Aid Provision to Latin America
and the World: 1946-2001
lnMilitaryAid Pr(MilitaryAid)
(1) (2)
US intervention (Dummy) 1.565*** 0.321***
(0.425) (0.060)
USintervention ∗ LAC -1.484*** -0.301***
(0.530) (0.084)
Political Regime (W ) (Index 0-1 Democratic) 0.866 1.729***
(2.579) (0.293)
PoliticalRegime ∗ LAC 0.350 -4.382***
(4.433) (0.641)
Ideology (Index 0-10 Conservative) -1.649*** -0.446***
(0.583) (0.124)
Ideology ∗ LAC 0.704 -0.471***
(0.574) (0.087)
W ∗ Ideo 0.099 -0.294***
(0.443) (0.051)
W ∗ Ideo ∗ LAC -0.365 0.792***
(0.780) (0.112)
W ∗ Intervention -1.959*** -0.017
(0.733) (0.099)
W ∗ Intervention ∗ LAC 2.892*** 0.136
(0.915) (0.148)
Guerrilla -0.088* 0.021**
(0.047) (0.009)
Guerrilla ∗ LAC 0.084 0.010
(0.076) (0.016)
Reagan -3.446*** -0.093
(0.711) (0.092)
Reagan ∗ LAC -1.094*** -0.248***
(0.369) (0.055)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 Influence) -0.092 0.029
(0.194) (0.030)
Share of government GDP (RB) 3.955*** 1.052***
(0.807) (0.096)
RB2 -0.147*** -0.045***
(0.029) (0.004)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 1,381 3,019
R-squared 0.158 0.258
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Soviet Influence, amount of trade, contiguous
border, common language, GATT participant, regional trade agreement.
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are shown in parentheses. *** is significant
at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.A.4: US Ideology and Aid Provision
lnEconomicAid - no Exports lnEconomicAid - with Exports
World Latin America World Latin America
(1) (2) (3) (4)
US intervention (Dummy) 0.862** -0.121 0.667* -0.122
(0.367) (0.324) (0.365) (0.327)
Political Regime (W) (Index 0-1 Democratic) 0.172 -4.275** 0.129 -4.258**
(1.485) (1.890) (1.459) (1.873)
W ∗ Ideo 0.124 0.864*** 0.099 0.858***
(0.239) (0.312) (0.237) (0.309)
W ∗ Intervention -0.586 0.449 -0.286 0.461
(1.001) (0.496) (0.995) (0.498)
Selectorate size (eS) (Index 0-1 Influence) 0.147 -0.173 0.202 -0.179
(0.198) (0.313) (0.188) (0.317)
US Exports 0.371*** 0.170
(0.089) (0.240)
Share of government GDP (RB) 3.237*** 12.353*** 3.229*** 12.329***
(0.788) (2.310) (0.728) (2.317)
RB2 -0.157*** -0.502*** -0.162*** -0.502***
(0.033) (0.088) (0.030) (0.088)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,494 604 1,494 604
Controls not shown: Ln pop, alignment with US (tau), Soviet Influence, amount of trade, contiguous border, common language,
GATT participant, regional trade agreement, new leader and years in office.
Notes: Newey-West robust standard errors in parentheses (30 lags). *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5%
level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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2.B Classification of countries by region
Table 2.B.1: Classification: World Bank
Region Countries
East Asia and Pa-
cific
Samoa, Cambodia, China, Taiwan, Fiji, Indone-
sia, South Korea, North Korea, Laos, Malaysia,
Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Palau, Papua New
Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thai-
land, Vietnam
Middle East and
North Africa
Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia,
Yemen.
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Bu-
rundi, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Guinea,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda, Sene-
gal, Ethiopia, Gabon, Seychelles, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Central African Republic,
Chad, Comoro Islands, Congo DR, Congo REP,
Cote D’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Eritrea, Kenya,
Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
Niger, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Somalia, Su-
dan, Swaziland, Sao Tome & Principe, Tanza-
nia, Togo, Uganda.
Latin America and
the Caribbean
Antigua, Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Dominican
Republic, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, St. Kitts/Nevis, St. Vincent, Suriname,
Uruguay, Venezuela.
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Chapter 3
Corporate Social Responsibility
and the Economy
Abstract
What are the determinants of a firm to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) and under what conditions is it likely to occur? This paper presents evidence
of two possible mechanisms that affect the decision of a firm to engage in CSR: the
role of growth in value added within an industry and workers’ attitudes. The results
suggest that firms engage in CSR practices in times of economic prosperity. I also
provide further evidence that peer effects are important on the decision of a firm
to participate in CSR. When the proportion of firms engaged in CSR increases,
the probability of a firm that hasn’t engaged before increases. With respect to
workers’ attitudes, this paper provides evidence of a weak link between labour
force preferences and a firm’s decision to engage in CSR.
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3.1 Introduction
During the last few decades, there has been an increasing interest by firms, gov-
ernments and society to include Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) into the
firm’s business strategy (e.g. Siegel and Vitaliano 2007; Lankoski 2009; Lundgren
2011; Jenkins 2005; Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes 2003, among others). Such in-
terest in corporate social responsibility is considered the "latest manifestation of
a longstanding debate over the relationship between business and society" (Jenk-
ins, 2005). The recent attention by the media and academic literature has mostly
focused on the environmental impact of firms. Yet, this notion has expanded to
include issues such as human rights, community strengthening, sexual diversity,
employees’ rights, among others. As Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) recognize,
"Corporate Social Responsibility is an important economic phenomenon with ex-
tensive implications for firms, employees, consumers, investors, governments and
NGOs alike." This paper provides empirical evidence that helps to understand
under what conditions corporate social responsibility could take place.
What are the determinants of a firm to engage in CSR and under what con-
ditions is it likely to occur? The response of CSR activities to business cycle
fluctuations is key to understanding how firms behave. Cyclical fluctuations in
CSR activities may help explain the way the prevailing macroeconomic context
affects firm’s decisions on CSR (Branca, Pina, and Catalao-Lopes, 2012). Unfor-
tunately, there hasn’t been enough research about the actual fluctuations in CSR
investments. There is a small empirical literature discussing the determinants of
CSR both through the institutional side and strategic side, but the lessons from this
literature are mixed. For the purpose of this paper, I consider the definition of CSR
to be "actions that, to some degree, imply corporate beyond-compliance behavior
in the social and/or the environmental arena" (Lundgren, 2011). In other words,
CSR implies a behavior beyond the prevailing legal or regulatory requirements. As
noted, this includes not only environmental measures, but also community building,
96
human rights protection, employee relations, gender representation and diversity,
among others.
In this paper, I take a closer look at the cyclicality of CSR activities and other
determinants to CSR that have not been accounted for in previous literature. To do
so, I use COMPUSTAT and KLD to construct a firm-level panel dataset containing
CSR activities and firm characteristics for a period spanning 12 years (1998-2010).
I complement COMPUSTAT with data on industry value added using the US
Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) data. Finally, for the
last part of the paper I include data on labor force attitudes towards key areas
of CSR (e.g. environment, human rights and diversity) using American National
Election Surveys (ANES) to assess the linkages (or lack thereof) between workers
and firms.
This paper makes a contribution to the broader literature by narrowing the gap
between the evidence available and the information required for making theoret-
ical assumptions about the cyclicality of CSR activities. In particular, the paper
exploits the information contained in COMPUSTAT and ANES to asses two pos-
sible mechanisms that affect the decision of a firm to engage in CSR: the role of
the business cycle and workers’ attitudes. By analyzing these two mechanisms I
do not intend to make an overly deterministic claim that these are the only two
mechanisms responsible for the adoption of social responsibility, but I find that the
macroeconomic conditions do affect the entrepreneurial decisions to engage in CSR,
and workers’ attitudes can drive the firm’s decisions to implement CSR activities,
particularly of diversity CSR practices within a firm.
The results of the paper indicate that overall there is a strong and positive
relationship between the growth in value added in the firm’s industry and the
decision to engage in CSR. This relationship, while strong for most of the firms,
does not hold for top-performing firms, who seem to engage in CSR regardless
of their industry value added. Furthermore, peer effects are relevant for a firm’s
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decision to engage in CSR up to a point when the agglomeration of firms engaging
in CSR is no longer relevant for another firm to engage in CSR within the same
industry.
Finally, the results also indicate that overall workers preferences are not driving
a firm to engage in CSR, proving a weak link between firm’s engagement in CSR
and workers’ attitudes. However, there is evidence that attitudes towards LGBT
have enough relevance to influence the decision of a firm to engage in diversity CSR
activities.
Relation to the literature To my knowledge, there are very few papers
which estimate the effect of macroeconomic conditions and workers’ attitudes on
CSR adoption. For example, while Branca, Pina, and Catalao-Lopes (2012) show
that firms are expected to reduce CSR spending when the business cycle is unfavor-
able. They only analyze the corporate giving dimension of CSR without taking into
consideration other CSR activities such as environmental, human rights, diversity,
etc. Campbell (2007) argues that firms will not behave socially responsible when
they are operating in an unhealthy economic environment, however he does not
provide empirical evidence of this statement. Hsiang-Lin, Hsiang-Hsuan, and Tzu-
Yin (2010) empirically test Campbell’s argument by including the inflation rate,
industrial production index and the consumer confidence index as the economic
variables. They find that firms located in countries with higher consumer confi-
dence levels and lower inflationary levels will act in more socially responsible ways,
but they only estimate the results for financial firms in a country level setting.
The closest paper to mine in terms of the cyclicality of CSR is Branca, Pina, and
Catalao-Lopes (2012). Although we look at related issues in a similar context, we
have very different approaches. Methodologically, Branca, Pina, and Catalao-Lopes
(2012) take a times series approach by estimating the cross correlation pattern of
CSR giving and firm revenues with real GDP. They find a significant co-movement
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between real GDP and CSR giving. In contrast, I use panel data to estimate the
relationship between the growth in industry value added and the probability of a
firm to engage in CSR activities.
My approach has several advantages and provides new insights on the effects of
macroeconomic conditions on the decision of companies’ to act in socially respon-
sible ways. First, I offer more precise and reliable estimates on the impact of the
business cycle on CSR by using firm’s data. By using IRS data, Branca, Pina, and
Catalao-Lopes (2012) focus solely on giving as the only measure of CSR. But data
limitations do not allow her to control for any other firm’s characteristics.
From the workers’ preferences perspective, the closest paper is Marquis, Glynn,
and Davis (2007). They provide a framework to look at how the community and
culture pressure firms to implement CSR. Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007) sug-
gest that communities are important influencers on corporate action. There are
two main reasons for this argument. First, the set of rules and norms that are in
place in the community serve also as a benchmark for legitimizing CSR (see also
Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007); Joshua D Margolis and James P Walsh (2003)).
Second, CSR activities are commonly oriented towards the community where the
corporation’s executive reside (Marquis, Glynn, and Davis, 2007). However, Mar-
quis, Glynn, and Davis (2007) does not provide any empirical analysis of their
framework. Several studies in the US have shown that this is the case by using
small samples of firms across the country. Most of these research are study cases,
for example Galaskiewicz and Wasserman (1989) looks at local giving patterns of
Minneapolis based companies and how they are influenced by network effects.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no study that includes workers’ attitudes
from ANES into the analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility and data on firms
from COMPUSTAT and KLD for the period that I consider (1998-2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a broader
literature review on the determinants of CSR, Section 3 includes a description of
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the dataset and some basic facts. The empirical methodology and the main results
of the paper are described in Section 4 and 5 accordingly. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
Research on CSR has mainly focused on investigating the relationship between cor-
porate social responsibility and corporate financial performance (Joshua D Mar-
golis and James P Walsh (2003), Bagnoli and Watts (2003),Orlitzky, Schmidt,
and Rynes (2003), among others). Most of these studies focus on determining
the extent to which socially responsible corporate behavior affects financial per-
formance. These studies have established a positive relationship between firm’s
economic performance and social responsibility by attracting socially responsible
consumers (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003), reducing the threat of regulation (Maxwell,
Thomas P. Lyon, and Hackett, 1998), improving their reputation, and reducing con-
cern from non governmental organizations (see Joshua D. Margolis, Elfenbein, and
James P. Walsh (2007), McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright (2006), McWilliams and
Siegel (2001), Hull and Rothenberg (2008), Lundgren (2011), Reinhardt, Stavins,
and Vietor (2008), Baron (2001), Thomas Peyton Lyon and Maxwell (2007)).
Joshua D Margolis and James P Walsh (2003) review this literature and find
that out of 127 published studies that empirically analyze the relationship between
firms’ corporate social responsibility and their financial performance, 85 percent of
the studies treat CSR as independent variable, and only 22 studies treat CSR as
dependent variable. Moreover, they show that there has been a tendency to ignore
several factors, other than corporate financial performance, which may affect CSR.
This leaves room to analyze factors other than corporate financial performance that
may affect corporate social responsibility.
As noted above, most of the literature on corporate social responsibility does
not explore whether macroeconomic conditions affect the likelihood of firms to
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behave in socially responsible ways. The increasing number of empirical studies
attempt to establish models of strategic CSR. For example McWilliams and Siegel
(2001) employ regression analysis to evaluate the relationship between profitability
and CSR using the overall firm-level index of CSR data from KLD. Most of the
research that empirically test this relationship uses CSR as an explanatory vari-
able, including a few other characteristics of the firm that may affect the firm’s
profitability measures. Among this research, Baron (2001) and McWilliams and
Siegel (2001) were the first to explicitly model "profit maximizing" CSR.
Most of the literature follows the same line, although there are a few that
include other characteristics. For example Navarro (1988) looks at the effect of
the tax structure on corporate giving; Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007) show
that pressures at the community level shape corporate action; Bagnoli and Watts
(2003) argues that the provision of a good depends on consumers’ willingness to
pay and on the structure of competition.
Macroeconomic conditions and Corporate Social Responsibility. Among
the few papers that look at the relationship between the macroeconomic environ-
ment and CSR are: Branca, Pina, and Catalao-Lopes (2012) that test empirically
the relationship between corporate giving and the business cycle. Their findings
suggest that with adverse economic conditions, firms are expected to reduce CSR
spending, independently of the market structure. Ullmann (1985) states that "in
periods of low profitability, economic demands will have priority over social de-
mands..."; and Campbell (2007) argues that corporations will be less likely to
behave in a socially responsible way when the operating environment is limited.
While most of these studies are only normative, Branca, Pina, and Catalao-
Lopes (2012) empirically tests the relationship between firm’s giving and the macroe-
conomic environment. Similarly, I examine the role of macroeconomic conditions
on the firm’s decision to engage in CSR.
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Worker’s Attitudes and Corporate Social Responsibility. For worker’s
attitudes, the role of individual or community attitudes towards CSR is less ex-
plored. There is one study from Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007) that explains
how the community in which firms are embedded affects the nature and level of
corporate social actions. They propose that community-level cultural forces af-
fect the nature of corporate social action, but they do not empirically test their
hypothesis. Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012), assert that the labor force social
preferences may translate into demand for corporate social responsibility.
For community pressure I use data from US national surveys1 to analyze the
possibility that workers’ pressure toward firms may have a larger role for adopt-
ing CSR measures –with respect to specific CSR activities, such as environment,
diversity, employment, among others–.
3.3 Data
Data for this research consists of a panel dataset of 4,785 large publicly traded
companies listed on the main international stock exchanges, with observations from
1998 to 2010. I have four main sources of data to look at Corporate Social Respon-
sibility; it’s relationship with the macroeconomic environment and to labor force
preferences. First, KLD from 1998 to 2010 (12 years). The second is COMPUS-
TAT, which covers the same years. The third data source is industry value added
from the US Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) with ob-
servations from 1998 to 2010. Finally, I include data on workers opinions towards
key areas of CSR (e.g. environment, human rights and diversity) using American
National Election Surveys (ANES) from 1998 to 2009.
KLD (Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research and Analytics). Is an
annual dataset on environmental, social, and governance ratings. It is published
at the end of each calendar year. It identifies the company information (Name,
1Data from national surveys provided by the American National Elections Survey
102
Ticker, unique security identifiers), and provides 50 CSR indicators organized in
seven categories: the environment, community, human rights, employees, diversity,
production and corporate governance. Table 3.1 describes the seven areas covered
by the KLD and their components.2 The number of firms in the sample has a
substantial increase in 2003, and from that year onward KLD added CSR ratings
for all firms belonging to the Russell1000Index.
COMPUSTAT. Is an annual database of financial, statistical, and market
information on global companies. The characteristics include indicators such as
total assets, earnings, industry classification, sales, number of employees, among
others. Such characteristics would most likely account for time varying conditions
faced by the firm.
Value Added by Industry. This data comes form the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. It includes the value added by industry sector. The data is available
from 1998 to 2010.
Labour Force Opinion. It comes from the American National Election Stud-
ies survey which conducts a bi-annual survey on the state of individual’s attitudes
towards an array of issues. In particular, I use information about workers’ attitudes
(on a 0 to 100 scale, 100 being positive) towards LGBT rights, unions and envi-
ronmentalists. Such data is coded by state and matched to the state in which the
firm is based. Although this might not directly capture the workers’ opinions each
individual firm faces, it would provide a proxy for the type of attitudes prevailing
in the American electorate as a whole.
The purpose of the paper is to analyze the effect of economic activity on the
decision to engage in CSR activities. In addition to economic activity (measured
here with the growth of value added), there are other factors that can influence
CSR activities. These factors should also be included in the regression to control
for their potential influence on CSR decisions. According to Belu and Manescu
2For more detailed explanation visit www.msci.com.
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Table 3.1: CSR Indicators and Components
Indicator Components
Environmental Beneficial Products and Services
Pollution Prevention
Recycling
Clean Energy
Management Systems
Other
Community Charitable Giving
Innovative Giving
Community Engagement
Other
Human Rights Indigenous Peoples Relations Strength
Human Rights Policies and initiative
Employee Relations Union Relations
Cash Profit Sharing
Employee Involvement
Health and Safety
Supply Chain Policies, Programs and Initiative
Other
Diversity Representation (women and minorities)
Board of Directors (women and minorities)
Work/Life Benefits
Women and Minority Contracting
Gay and Lesbian Policies
Employment of Under represented Groups
Other
Product Quality
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged
Access to Capital
Product Safety
Marketing/Contracting Concern
Antitrust
Customer Relations Concern
Governance Reporting Quality
Public Policy
Source: www.msci.com
104
(2013) firm size is relevant for economic performance. The bigger the firm, higher
variation on profitability of the firms. Market structure is important for CSR, since
it affects the decision of adopting CSR (Bagnoli and Watts, 2003). Results can
vary significantly depending on the market structure. If markets are competitive,
monopolistic or oligopolistic, market power enables some firms to always to earn
unusual returns.
3.4 Methodology
In the empirical implementation of this paper I run a set of fixed effects regressions
to estimate the relation between CSR adoption and the business cycle as well as
the relation between CSR and labor force opinions. All results presented account
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. I assume a linear probability model
(LPM), where changes in the explanatory variables have a linear effect on the
change in the probability of adopting CSR and no arbitrary choice of a nonlinear
regression function is made (Wooldridge, 2002). Econometrically, it is difficult to
estimate using alternatives like fixed effects Probit using standard methodologies.3
Hence, I estimate equation 3.1 with a linear probability model in which: CSRijt
is an indicator variable that equals one when firm i from industry j engages in
any CSR activity at time t, and zero otherwise; Growthjt−1 is the growth in value
added observed for industry j at time t− 1; Xijt is a set of firm characteristics (see
below); t is a linear trend capturing the overall growing importance of CSR over
time; and uijt is an i.i.d idiosyncratic error term.
While T is not sufficiently large in our sample, I also allow uijt to follow an
AR(1) process: uij,t = ρuij,t−1 + ijt.4 The magnitude of the estimated coefficient
3A Logit model would provide adequate standard errors but with a biased estimate, since I
wouldn’t be accounting for unobserved heterogeneity. I decided to estimate a fixed effects model
to have an unbiased estimate.
4I also allow for an AR(2) process and heteroskedasticity in our unbalanced panel using xtAR-
GLS and results do not differ from the ones assuming the error term follows an AR(1) process
(column (3) in Table 3.3). Furthermore I also present Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll
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of interest (β) does not change dramatically and remains statistically significant.
CSRijt = αi + βGrowthjt−1 + δXijt + γt+ uijt (3.1)
Peer effects. To analyze how the proportion of firms within the same industry
affect the decision to engage in CSR for a particular firm in the same industry, I
estimate equation 3.2, where αi and Xijt are defined as before, I further include
year fixed effects (γ), and interest lies in θ and Θ.
CSRijt = αi + γt + θpfirms+ Θpfirms
2 + δXijt + uijt (3.2)
Labor Force opinions. I exploit state-level variation in workers attitudes
(towards specific issues) to assess if these attitudes have an effect on the likelihood
of firms to engage in (overall and thematic) CSR. I estimate equation 3.3 using a
fixed effects LPM.
CSRist = αi + δXist + ηLGBTst + λUnionsst + ρEnvst + γt + uist (3.3)
Controls. I consider a number of control variables (Xijt) that are related
to the firm’s characteristics, and are always included in the specialized literature
related to CSR. They include firm size; return on assets interacted by number of
employees, as another measure of firm’s size, advertising intensity, R&D expenses,
and the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI).
Return on Assets (ROA) is a profitability measure that expresses the amount
of net income plus (after tax) interest payments but before preferred dividend per
unit of average current and last year’s assets (Belu and Manescu, 2013). Firm size
is measured as the number of employees of the firm; advertising intensity is defined
as the log advertising expenses; R&D intensity is the log of R&D expenses. The
and Kraay, 1998) that are robust to both, spatial and serial autocorrelation of uij,t
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Hirschman-Herfindahl Index for each industry is defined at the six-digit NAICS
code level. It is computed by adding the square of the market share of all players
operating in an industry a given year.5 As displayed in Table 3.2, the control
variables have values similar to the existing literature.
Summary Statistics. In total, I start with 4,785 firms, resulting in an un-
balanced panel with an average length of 5.5 years. An important feature of the
empirical strategy is the inclusion of firm fixed effects. To have enough within-firm
variation, I further refine the sample to firms with at least 4 years of data. This
results in a final sample of 3,068 firms with an average length of 6 years. Table 3.2
includes summary statistics for the sample.
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
ROA (Return on Assets in logs) 0.771 0.18 15,865
Emp (Number of employees) 16.355 56.96 23,063
ROA× Emp 17.219 57.916 15,743
HHI (Herfindahl Index) 0.187 0.177 23,368
R&D (log of R&D expenditures) 0.072 0.527 23,368
Advert (log of Advertisement expenditures) 4.113 7.275 23,368
Growthjt−1 (Growth in Value added) 0.03 0.111 19,809
LGBT (CSR diversity index) 0.5 0.07 14,442
Unions (Union relations index) 0.564 0.055 14,442
Environment (CSR environment index) 0.65 0.046 13,601
Pfirms (# firms CSR/#firms industry) 0.560 0.172 23,368
3.5 Results
3.5.1 CSR and Growth by Industry.
In this section, I asses the relationship between the growth of value added and the
probability of a firm engaging in CSR. My first estimation results are reported in
Table 3.3. Column 1 reports the results of a linear probability model with fixed
5See Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010), Belu and Manescu (2013), Liu and Wu, 2015, and
Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo (2010) for further details.
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effects and in the next columns I account for the possibility of misspecification due
to autocorrelation in my data.
I find that the coefficient on the growth of value added, Growthjt−1, is positive
and statistically significant even after accounting for autocorrelation. Column 2
reports the estimates of equation 3.1 with autocorrelation of order AR1. I find
that the coefficient on the growth of value added, Growthjt−1 , is positive and
statistically significant. Also, given that the confidence intervals of the coefficients
on Growthjt−1 overlap, I will keep the most parsimonious model with no autocor-
relation for the rest of the paper. For a further check of the results in Table 3.3,
I include the difference of the dependent variable by looking at firm’s transitions
to engage in CSR or stop doing CSR activities; the results hold with positive and
significant coefficients as seen in the Appendix Table 3.A.1.
Gazelles vs. Elephants. Even though the overall results reflect that the
economic environment at the industrial level (i.e. Growthjt−1) is important on the
decision of a firm to engage in CSR, we estimate the heterogeneous treatment by
the firm’s economic performance.6 I find that the Growthjt−1 of the industry is
insignificant for the best performers of the industry “Gazelles” (top 25 percent) to
engage in CSR. For the “Elephants” (bottom 75 percent), it appears that even when
controlling for firm’s characteristics and a time trend, an increase in Growthjt−1
leads to an increase in the probability to engage in CSR Campbell (2007).
Decision to transition to CSR (D−CSR). Table 3.B.3 shows the marginal
effects of a multinomial logit where the probability to engage in CSR when there is
a ten percentage increase in Growthjt−1 the probability of adopting CSR increases
by 1.7 percentage points (equivalent to 25 percent), with respect to not adopting.
Similarly, when there is a ten percentage increase in Growthjt−1 the probability of
disengaging in CSR decreases by 4 percentage points (equivalent to 62 percent).
6Economic performance is measured as Return on Assets (ROA) in my sample.
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Table 3.3: Corporate Social Responsibility and Growth of Value Added
by Industry
Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS Logit AR(1) AR(ρ)
Growthjt−1 0.16*** 1.53*** 0.075*** 0.10*** 0.16***
(0.057) (0.31) (0.029) (0.029) (0.035)
# Employees -0.00080 0.0076 -0.00011 -0.00074 -0.00080**
(0.00086) (0.0084) (0.0010) (0.00047) (0.00032)
ROA× Emp 0.0011 0.0100 0.00048 0.0012*** 0.0011***
(0.00092) (0.0084) (0.0010) (0.00040) (0.00030)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.11 -0.94** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.11
(0.092) (0.39) (0.050) (0.059) (0.071)
ln R&D expenditures 0.0084** 0.12 0.0060 0.0067* 0.0084
(0.0038) (0.079) (0.0057) (0.0034) (0.0049)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.0031** 0.031*** 0.0049*** 0.0037** 0.0031**
(0.0016) (0.012) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0013)
Year 0.011*** 0.12*** 0.0070*** 0.011**
(0.0031) (0.013) (0.0013) (0.0047)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,491 6,591 11,248 13,139 13,491
Number of id 2,243 1,003 2,144 2,123
Number of groups 2,243
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown
include firm fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at
the 10% level.
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Table 3.4: Heterogeneous effects: Gazelles vs. Elephants
Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2)
Elephants Gazelles
Growthjt−1 0.23*** -0.018
(0.063) (0.071)
# Employees -0.0017** -0.00092
(0.00083) (0.0019)
ROA× Emp 0.0019*** 0.0010
(0.00068) (0.0021)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.14 -0.25*
(0.11) (0.14)
ln R&D expenditures 0.0075 0.011**
(0.0057) (0.0040)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.0056*** -0.0079**
(0.0017) (0.0038)
Year 0.010*** 0.0100**
(0.0036) (0.0039)
Firm FE YES YES
Observations 10,025 3,466
R-squared 0.016 0.020
Number of id 2,032 791
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown
in parentheses. Variables not shown include firm fixed effects. *** is
significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant
at the 10% level.
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Table 3.5: Marginal effects: Multinomial logit
Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2)
Engage Disengage
Growthjt−1 0.17** -0.40***
(0.072) (0.066)
# Employees -0.0043*** 0.0023
(0.0012) (0.0014)
ROA× Emp 0.0052*** -0.0031
(0.0015) (0.0023)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.049 -0.0086
(0.034) (0.035)
ln R&D expenditures 0.0069 -0.0053
(0.0073) (0.021)
ln Advertisement expenditures -0.00074 -0.0017***
(0.00092) (0.00063)
Observations 3,605 3,605
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown
in parentheses for the last two columns. Variables not shown include
firm fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at
the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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3.5.2 Peer effects and the decision to engage in CSR.
Even though there is an increasing literature on CSR, little is known about how
CSR can influence or be influenced by peer firms or industry dynamics. To my
knowledge, only two studies have tried to determine the peer effects of corporate
social responsibility (see Liu and Wu 2015; Cao, Liang, and Zhan 2015). Both
studies studies present evidence on how firms react to their peers’ adoption of
CSR. They find that the effects are stronger amongst peers with higher competitive
pressure and a more transparent information environment (Cao, Liang, and Zhan,
2015). Furthermore, Liu and Wu (2015) show that when a firm’s competitors
exhibit a higher level of CSR, the firm is more likely to engage in CSR activities.
A problem that may arise when looking at peer effects, is the probability of
a firm’s CSR and the competitor’s CSR being driven by the same industry level
shocks, which could lead to the appearance of peer effects. Similarly, if the firm
and its competitors are geographically close, region-level shocks may also affect the
interpretation. To deal with this issue, I include industry times year fixed effects
and state times year fixed effects in the analysis (see Liu and Wu (2015)). This
way, any time-varying trends in industry and region level will be controlled.
Following their results, I find that an increase in the proportion of firms doing
CSR within a given industry increases the probability of a firm that was not pre-
viously engaged in CSR to decide to adopt it (see Table 3.6). However, this is true
up to a point after which the proportion of firms starts to be less relevant in the
decision to engage in CSR. The analysis suggests that when 79 percent of the in-
dustry engages in CSR, the probability of another firm engaging in CSR given their
peers engaging in these activities decreases (see Figure 3.1). Overall, the results
coincide with those of Cao, Liang, and Zhan (2015) and Liu and Wu (2015) that
a firm’s CSR policy is partly shaped by the CSR activities of its competitors. The
result is consistent with the theory that firms consider CSR as strategic (Siegel and
Vitaliano, 2007; Fernandez-Kranz and Santalo, 2010; Belu and Manescu, 2013) .
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The results of the estimations on peer effects on the decision to engage in
CSR are provided in Table 3.6, which presents evidence for 3 different dependent
variables: CSR (Column (1)), D − CSR (Column (2)), and Intensity (Column
(3)). Intensity is measured as the amount of CSR strengths defined by KLD within
a firm.7
As shown in Table 3.6, the coefficients of Pfirm and Pfirm2 have the expected
signs and are significant, indicating that the decision to engage in CSR is affected by
their peers in their industry until a point when it becomes less relevant.8 Column
(3) reports how peers in the same industry affect the intensity in which a firm
engages in CSR. Contrary to CSR and D−CSR, peer effects are not concave for
intensity. The higher the percentage of firms engaged in CSR the higher the CSR
intensity of a given firm.
So far I have shown that there is evidence that an increase in growth in value
added by industry also increases the probability of a firm to engage in Corporate
Social Responsibility. This effect seems to be stronger for firms that are not the
best performers of their industry. Furthermore, peers within an industry have an
influence in the decision of a firm to engage in CSR up to a point. In the following
section I also include the analysis of workers attitudes and its effect on the firm’s
decision to do CSR.
3.5.3 Labor force preferences and CSR.
As explained above, several studies argue that communities’ choices put pressure
on firms to engage in CSR. Following McWilliams and Siegel (2001), their demand
theory suggests that consumers value CSR attributes, and furthermore, companies
incorporate CSR into their marketing strategies because “they wish to exploit the
appeal of CSR to consumers”. However, as Pomering and Dolnicar (2009) suggests,
7Intensity is a polytomous and ordinal dependent variable that goes from 0 to 6 if the firm
engages in more than one type of CSR: government, diversity, employment, human relations,
community, or environment.
8Pfirm and Pfirm2 are jointly significant and different from zero.
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Table 3.6: Peer effects and Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2) (3)
CSR D-CSR Intensity
Pfirms (# firms CSR/|# firms Industry) 1.40*** 1.35*** 1.37***
(0.10) (0.12) (0.31)
Pfirms2 -0.62*** -0.81*** -0.53*
(0.085) (0.11) (0.29)
# Employees -0.0012 -0.0010 -0.0014
(0.00078) (0.00091) (0.0018)
ROA× Emp 0.00097 0.0011 0.00100
(0.00081) (0.00100) (0.0020)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.041 -0.10* 0.19
(0.044) (0.055) (0.14)
ln R&D expenditures 0.0021 -0.0019 -0.00072
(0.0047) (0.0024) (0.027)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.0011 0.0010 -0.0093**
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0041)
Firm FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Geography × yearFE YES YES YES
Industry × yearFE YES YES YES
Observations 13,491 13,540 15,743
R-squared 0.084 0.036 0.119
Number of id 2,243 2,250 2,281
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in parentheses. Vari-
ables not shown include firm and time fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is
significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Figure 3.1: Proportion of firms that engage in CSR
Note: The breaking point for the bivariate regression is 0.769; controlling for firm’s characteristics,
the breaking point increases to 0.792
worker’s awareness levels of CSR activities are low, which proves that the link
between CSR and workers is very low. The results in Table 3.7 further confirm
this. Overall, worker’s attitudes towards specific topics relevant to CSR activities
do not have an effect in a firm’s decision to engage in these activities.
Table 3.7 refines the sample by only selecting CSR activities that are relevant
to community attitudes towards specific topics. Column (1) presents the results
for only CSR activities related to diversity. The relationship between attitudes
towards LGBT and diversity is positive and significantly different from zero. This
suggests that firms consider views towards this attitude relevant enough to en-
gage in diversity CSR. However, attitudes towards unions and the environment
have no significant effect on CSR activities.9 Modeling these specifications with a
Logistic regression confirms the result (see results in the Appendix Table 3.B.4).
9Unfortunately, given that there is no within-state variation we cannot estimate further results.
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The marginal effects point in the same direction with respect to attitudes towards
LGBT.
Table 3.7: LGBT attitudes have a positive effect on a firm’s engagement
in diversity activities (Diversity-CSR)
Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2) (3)
Diversity Unions Environment
LGBT (CSR diversity index) 0.0017**
(0.00079)
Unions (CSR union relationship index) -0.10
(0.0015)
Environment (CSR environment index) 0.11
(0.0012)
# Employees -0.00059 0.00012 0.00026
(0.00061) (0.00098) (0.00092)
ROA× Emp 0.0014*** 0.00036 0.00038
(0.00039) (0.00074) (0.00076)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.032 -0.058 0.051
(0.10) (0.066) (0.041)
ln R&D expenditures 0.0032 0.010 0.0050
(0.0061) (0.0074) (0.0084)
ln Advertisement expenditures -0.0026 -0.0038* 0.00070
(0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Firm FE YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES
Observations 9,724 9,724 9,039
R-squared 0.069 0.048 0.058
Number of id 2,141 2,141 2,140
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. Variables not
shown include firm and time fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the
5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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3.6 Conclusions
This paper analyses the effect that economic activity, peer pressure and workers
preferences have in CSR. The evidence suggests that firms engage in CSR practices
in times of economic prosperity for each industry. I also provide further evidence
that peer effects are important on the decision of a firm to participate in CSR.
When the proportion of firms engaged in CSR increases, the probability of a firm
that hasn’t engaged before increases. However the proportion of firms engaged in
CSR becomes less relevant after almost 80 percent.
With respect to workers preferences, I find that pressure from workers can also
explain the decision of a firm to adopt CSR but only for diversity topics. Indeed,
I find that the labor force preferences towards LGBT have a strong positive effect
on the adoption of CSR measures of diversity. However, there was not enough
evidence to see an effect of any other workers preferences having an effect on the
firm’s decision to engage in CSR activities.
These findings could potentially have policy implications. Policymakers aiming
at promoting corporate socially responsible behaviors could stimulate CSR activ-
ities in a few firms and this would lead other firms to follow. Similarly, since it
appears that community behavior does have an effect on firm’s decision on en-
gaging with CSR, policymakers could provide initiatives to raise public awareness
on corporate social responsibility. Further research to understand the relation-
ship between workers preferences (and CSR awareness) and firm’s engagement in
corporate social responsibility is needed.
Appendices
3.A Robustness checks
Table 3.A.1: Firm’s decision to engage in CSR and Industry Growth
Decision to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS AR(1) AR(ρ)
Growthjt−1 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.15***
(0.045) (0.038) (0.032) (0.032)
# Employees -0.00091 -0.00018 -0.00061 -0.00091
(0.00084) (0.0012) (0.00045) (0.00084)
ROA× Emp 0.0010 0.00030 0.00072 0.0010
(0.00090) (0.0012) (0.00046) (0.00092)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.16** -0.12** -0.18*** -0.16**
(0.081) (0.054) (0.048) (0.054)
ln R&D expenditures 0.00098 0.0071 0.00083 0.00098
(0.0021) (0.0075) (0.0033) (0.0034)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.0025 0.0033** 0.0023 0.0025
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Year -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013**
(0.0023) (0.0014) (0.0045)
Firm FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 13,491 11,248 13,139 13,491
Number of id 2,243 2,144 2,123
Number of groups 2,243
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in parentheses.
Variables not shown include firm fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant
at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.A.2: Marginal effects of an increase in positive attitudes towards
topics related with CSR
Strengths of Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2) (3)
Diversity Unions Environment
LGBT (CSR diversity index) 0.69***
(0.18)
Unions (CSR union relations index) 0.058
(0.14)
Environment (CSR environment index) -0.076
(0.13)
# Employees -0.00095 0.00012 -0.00051
(0.00059) (0.00054) (0.0018)
ROA× Emp 0.0029*** -0.00048 0.00045
(0.00097) (0.00057) (0.0021)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.049 -0.076 -0.26***
(0.047) (0.053) (0.076)
ln R&D expenditures 0.029*** 0.041** 0.0043
(0.010) (0.017) (0.0074)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.0058*** 0.00049 -0.00090
(0.0013) (0.0014) (0.00087)
Observations 9,724 9,724 9,039
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. *** is
significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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3.B Lagged Regressions
Table 3.B.1: Lagged: Corporate Social Responsibility and Growth of
Value Added by Industry
Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS First Order Autocorrelation Spatial Autocorrelation
Growthjt−1 0.16*** 0.095*** 0.10*** 0.16***
(0.051) (0.029) (0.025) (0.042)
# Employees 0.078 0.79 0.14 0.078
(0.57) (0.99) (0.43) (0.41)
ROA× Emp -0.32 -0.89 -0.18 -0.32
(0.49) (0.98) (0.35) (0.46)
HHI (Herfindahl Index) -0.11 -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.11
(0.092) (0.050) (0.059) (0.069)
ln R&D expenditures -0.0022 -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0022
(0.0038) (0.0056) (0.0035) (0.0042)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.00055 0.0035** 0.0011 0.00055
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.00094)
Year 0.013*** 0.0088*** 0.013**
(0.0026) (0.0014) (0.0046)
Observations 13,474 11,237 13,132 13,474
Number of id 2,237 2,146 2,126
Number of groups 2,243
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include
firm fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.B.2: Lagged: Heterogeneous treatment effects: Gazelles vs. Ele-
phants
Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2)
Elephants Gazelles
Growthjt−1 0.22*** -0.0015
(0.059) (0.080)
# Employees 0.13 -1.33
(1.00) (2.37)
ROA× Emp -0.027 1.30
(0.53) (2.48)
ln R&D expendituers -0.0080 0.00092
(0.0054) (0.0043)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.0026 -0.0087
(0.0019) (0.0052)
Year 0.012*** 0.014***
(0.0032) (0.0038)
Observations 10,025 3,466
R-squared 0.016 0.020
Number of id 2,032 791
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are
shown in parentheses. Variables not shown include firm fixed ef-
fects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5%
level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.B.3: Lagged: Multinomial logit marginal effects of the decision
to engage in Corporate Social Responsibility and Growth by Industry
Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2)
Engage Disengage
Growthjt−1 0.19*** -0.40***
(0.063) (0.063)
# Employees -2.45 1.25
(1.59) (2.87)
ROA× Emp 2.77 -1.44
(2.06) (3.84)
ln R&D expenditures 0.00085 0.011
(0.0079) (0.016)
ln Advertisement expenditures -0.00025 -0.00078
(0.00095) (0.00062)
Observations 3,583 3,583
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are
shown in parentheses for the last two columns. Variables not shown
include firm fixed effects. *** is significant at the 1% level; ** is
significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3.B.4: Lagged: Marginal effects of an increase in positive attitudes
towards topics related with CSR
Strengths of Corporate Social Responsibility
(1) (2) (3)
Diversity Unions Environment
LGBT (CSR diversity index) 0.76***
(0.19)
Unions (CSR union relations index) 0.12
(0.16)
Environment (CSR environment index) -0.096
(0.15)
# Employees -0.63 -0.18 -1.21
(0.62) (0.74) (2.41)
ROA× Emp 2.17** -0.24 1.09
(1.03) (0.78) (2.73)
ln R&D expenditures 0.034** 0.043** 0.015
(0.015) (0.018) (0.0096)
ln Advertisement expenditures 0.0064*** 0.000087 -0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.00094)
Observations 8,039 8,039 7,718
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are shown in parentheses. *** is
significant at the 1% level; ** is significant at the 5% level; * is significant at the 10% level.
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3.A Stata code
************************************************
***********************************************/*
Elaborated by Eugenia Suarez as part of my dissertation project
esuare@essex.ac.uk
January 2016
This do-file presents the results of the paper "Informality and
taxes in Mexico"
OUTCOME TABLES: Table1-Table7.tex
FIGURES: chtaxrate_‘t’.png for t=2006/2014
chtaxrateall.png (pooling all years)
test_t_t+1.png for t=2005/2013
taxaveall.png (pooling all years)
SOURCES:
Microdata from INEGI
http://www.inegi.org.mx
A panel of individual may be constructed as 20% of the sample is
followed during 5 quarters
Variable definitions from
(http://www3.inegi.org.mx/rnmpre/index.php/catalog)
************************************************
************************************************/
version 13.1
clear all
drop _all
set linesize 255
set mem 5000M
set more off, permanently
run $dod/00_run_first.do
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run $dod/08_aux_dataprep.do
run $dod/08_aux_figures.do
**********************************[]*****************************
********************** SUMMARY STATISTICS TABLES ****************
*****************************************************************
keep if out_new!=1
** Table 1: Summary statistics
** All/Men/Women
sutex age schooly infor incomea grossincomeORIG taxprev_incpr ///
chtaxratepastinc if age>=.16 & age<=.65, minmax
sutex age schooly infor incomea grossincomeORIG taxprev_incpr ///
chtaxratepastinc if age>=.16 & age<=.65 & gender==1, minmax
sutex age schooly infor incomea grossincomeORIG taxprev_incpr ///
chtaxratepastinc if age>=.16 & age<=.65 & gender==2, minmax
** Table 2: Sample Statistics by Labor Market State and Gender
//Men
sutex age schooly infor incomea grossincomeORIG taxprev_incpr ///
chtaxratepastinc if age>=.16 & age<=.65 & gend==1 & infor==1, ///
file($td/desc.tex) replace
sutex age schooly infor incomea grossincomeORIG taxprev_incpr ///
chtaxratepastinc if age>=.16 & age<=.65 & gend==1 & infor==0, ///
file($td/desc.tex) append
//Women
sutex age schooly infor incomea grossincomeORIG taxprev_incpr ///
chtaxratepastinc if age>=.16 & age<=.65 & gend==2 & infor==1, ///
file($td/desc.tex) append
sutex age schooly infor incomea grossincomeORIG taxprev_incpr ///
chtaxratepastinc if age>=.16 & age<=.65 & gend==2 & infor==0, ///
file($td/desc.tex) append
*****************************************************************
********************* Table 1. Main results *********************
*****************************************************************
//All controls
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti), ///
cluster(entity) first r
outreg2 using $td/table1, tex replace label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti), cluster(entity) ///
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partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table1, tex append label less(1)
//OLS all controls
reg chinfor chtaxratepasti lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.cit ///
age agesq, r cluster(entity)
outreg2 using $td/table1, tex append label less(1)
// Women vs. Men
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city i.marr ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if gend==2, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table1, tex append label less(1)
reg chinfor chtaxratepasti lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city ///
i.married age agesq if gend==2, r cluster(entity)
outreg2 using $td/table1, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri =chtaxratepasti) if gend==1, ///
clus(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table1, tex append label less(1)
reg chinfor chtaxratepasti lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city ///
age agesq if gend==1, r cluster(entity)
outreg2 using $td/table1, tex append label less(1)
*****************************************************************
********************* Table 5. Income results *******************
*****************************************************************
// Poor vs. Rich
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.gend i.city ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) ///
if inc_prevy<62400, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.gender i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex replace label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.gend i.city ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) ///
if inc_prevy>=62400, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.gender i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append label less(1)
// Women & Low-Income
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city i.marr ///
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age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) ///
if inc_prevy<62400 & gend==2, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city i.marr ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) ///
if inc_prevy>=62400 & gend==2, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append label less(1)
// Men & Low-Income
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) ///
if inc_prevy<62400 & gend==1, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.scian i.qdate i.city ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) ///
if inc_prevy>=62400 & gend==1, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append label less(1)
*****************************************************************
********************* Table 2. Women results *******************
*****************************************************************
// General Women
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.cit i.marr ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if gend==2, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex replace label less(1)
// School years Women
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.cit i.marr ///
age agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly<=10 ///
& gend==2, cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) ///
first r
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.cit i.marr age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly>10 & gend==2, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append label less(1)
// Age Women
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xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.cit i.marr ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age<.38 & gend==2, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.cit i.marr ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age>=.38 & gend==2, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append label less(1)
//Urban vs. Rural Women
* Urban
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.cit i.marr age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if gend==2 & city<=43, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append label less(1)
* Rural
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.cit i.marrage ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if gend==2 & city>=81, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append label less(1)
*****************************************************************
********************** Table 3. Results Low-income **************
*****************************************************************
// General income
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.gend i.cit age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevyear<62400, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.gend i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex replace label less(1)
// School years Women
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.gend i.cit age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly<=10 & ///
inc_prevyear<62400, clu(entity) ///
partial(i.scian i.qdate i.gend i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.gend i.cit age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly>10 & ///
inc_prevyear<62400, clu(entity)///
partial(i.scian i.qdate i.gend i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex append label less(1)
// Age Women
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.gend i.cit ///
131
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age<.38 & inc_prevy<62400, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.gend i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.qdat i.gend i.cit ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age>=.38 & inc_prevy<62400, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.gend i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex append label less(1)
//Urban vs. Rural Income
* Urban
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevy<62400 & city<=43, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex append label less(1)
* Rural
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevy<62400 & city>=81, ///
cluster(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex append label less(1)
*****************************************************************
******************* Table 3. Poor & Women results **************
*****************************************************************
// General income & Women
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat i.marr age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevyear<62400 & ///
gend==2, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex replace label less(1)
// School years Income & Women
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat i.marr age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly<=10 & ///
inc_prevyear<62400 & gend==2, cl(entity) ///
partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat i.marr age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly>10 & ///
inc_prevyear<62400 & gend==2, cl(entity) ///
partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex append label less(1)
// Age Women
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat i.marr ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age<.38 & inc_prevy<62400 ///
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& gend==2, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat i.marr ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age>=.38 & inc_prevy<62400 ///
& gend==2, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex append label less(1)
//Urban vs. Rural Income
* Urban
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat i.marr age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevy<62400 ///
& city<=43 & gend==2, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) ///
first r
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex append label less(1)
* Rural
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat i.marr age ///
agesq (chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevy<62400 ///
& city>=81 & gend==2, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) ///
first r
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex append label less(1)
*****************************************************************
********************* Table 6. Men results *********************
*****************************************************************
// General Men
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if gend==1, cl(entity) ///
partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex replace label less(1)
// School years Men
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly<=10 & gend==1, ///
cl(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city) first r
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly>10 & gend==1, ///
cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append label less(1)
// Age Men
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age<.38 & gend==1, ///
cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
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outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age>=.38 & gend==1, ///
cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append label less(1)
//Urban vs. Rural Men
* Urban
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if gend==1 & city<=43, ///
cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append label less(1)
* Rural
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if gend==1 & city>=81, ///
cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append label less(1)
*****************************************************************
**************** Table 7. Men & Low-Income results *************
*****************************************************************
// General income & Men
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevy<62400 & gend==1, ///
cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table7, tex replace label less(1)
// School years Income & Men
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly<=10 & inc_prevy<62400 ///
& gend==1, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table7, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if schooly>10 & inc_prevy<62400 ///
& gend==1, cl(entity) partial(i.scian i.qdate i.city ) first r
outreg2 using $td/table7, tex append label less(1)
// Age Men
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age<.38 & inc_prevy<62400 ///
& gend==1, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table7, tex append label less(1)
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat ///
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(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if age>=.38 & inc_prevy<62400 ///
& gend==1, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table7, tex append label less(1)
//Urban vs. Rural Income Men
* Urban
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevy<62400 & city<=43 ///
& gend==1, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table7, tex append label less(1)
* Rural
xi: ivreg29 chinfor lL4gross i.sci i.cit i.qdat age agesq ///
(chtaxratecurri=chtaxratepasti) if inc_prevy<62400 & city>=81 ///
& gend==1, cl(entity) partial(i.sci i.cit i.qdat) first r
outreg2 using $td/table7, tex append label less(1)
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version 13.1
clear all
drop _all
set linesize 255
set mem 5000M
set more off, permanently
run $dod/00_run_first.do
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use $dd/Complete_data.dta, clear
macro drop cont
global cont "eS RB RB2 lnPOP tau LlnTRADE x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 Lciv"
global outr "label nocons obs td(3) less(0) bdec(3)"
global clu "cluster(ccode) robust"
****************************************************************
******************************** Estimation ********************
****************************************************************
****************************************************************
******************Table 1: Main specification
***** Amount of aid received
** Column 1
xtreg lnEaid W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region!="LAC", fe $clu
outreg2 using "$td/table1",tex replace $outr
** Column 2
xtreg lnEaid W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region=="LAC", fe $clu
outreg2 using "$td/table1", tex append $outr
** Column 3
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region!="LAC", fe $clu
outreg2 using "$td/table1",tex append $outr
** Column 4
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region=="LAC", fe $clu
outreg2 using "$td/table1", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
** Column 5
xtreg Eaid W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region!="LAC", fe $clu
*margins, dydx (*) post
outreg2 using "$td/table1", tex append $outr
** Column 6
xtreg Eaid W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region=="LAC", fe $clu
outreg2 using "$td/table1", tex append $outr
** Column 7
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region!="LAC", fe $clu
*margins, dydx (*) post
outreg2 using "$td/table1", tex append $outr
** Column 8
136
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W $cont RUSinfluence i.year if ///
region=="LAC", fe $clu
outreg2 using "$td/table1", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
******************Table 2: Lciv LConInd lnPOP tau (table 4)
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 1
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint $cont RUSinfluence ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office i.year if region!="LAC" , ///
fe clus(ccode) robust
outreg2 using "$td/table2", tex replace $outr
*** LAC
** Column 2
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint $cont RUSinfluence ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office i.year if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table2", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 3
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint $cont if region!="LAC",fe ///
$clus
outreg2 using "$td/table2", tex append $outr
*** LAC
** Column 4
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint $cont if region=="LAC",fe ///
$cluse
outreg2 using "$td/table2", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
******************Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
** Table 3: Summary statistics
sutex lnEaid Eaid lnMaid Maid USinfluence W ideology wideo ///
wint eS RB ln_per_capita_income if region!="LAC"
sutex lnEaid Eaid lnMaid Maid USinfluence W ideology wideo ///
wint eS RB ln_per_capita_income if region=="LAC"
****************************************************************
******************Table 4: Including US exports
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 1
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint usexpor $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office i.year if region!="LAC",fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4", tex replace $outr
*** LAC
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** Column 2
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint usexpor $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office i.year if region=="LAC",fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 3
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint usexports $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office if region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4", tex append $outr
*** LAC
** Column 4
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint usexports $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
******************Table 5:Guerrillas & Civil War & Reagan
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 1
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint Guerilla reagan $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office i.year if region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5", tex replace $outr
*** LAC
** Column 2
xtreg lnEaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint Guerilla reagan $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office i.year if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 3
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint Guerilla reagan $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office if region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5", tex append $outr
*** LAC
** Column 4
xtreg Eaid USinfluence W ideo wideo wint Guerilla reagan $cont ///
new_leader_dum year_in_office if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
****************************** Appendix Tables *****************
****************************** MILITARY AID ******************
****************************************************************
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******************Table 1: Main specification
***** Amount of aid received
** Column 1
xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W $cont i.year if region!="LAC",fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table1a", tex replace $outr
** Column 2
xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W $cont i.year if region=="LAC",fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table1a", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
** Column 3
xtreg Maid USinfluence W $cont i.year if region!="LAC",fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table1a", tex append $outr
** Column 4
xtreg Maid USinfluence W $cont i.year if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table1a", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
******************Table 2: Lciv LConInd lnPOP tau (table 4)
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 1
xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W wideo wint $cont i.year if ///
region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table2a", tex replace $outr
*** LAC
** Column 2
xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W wideo wint $cont i.year if ///
region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table2a", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 3
xtreg Maid USinfluence W wideo wint $cont i.year if ///
region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table2a", tex append $outr
*** LAC
** Column 4
xtreg Maid USinfluence W wideo wint $cont i.year if ///
region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table2a", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
******************Table 4: Including US exports
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 1
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xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W wideo wint usexpor $cont i.year ///
if region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4a", tex replace $outr
*** LAC
** Column 2
xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W wideo wint usexpor $cont i.year ///
if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4a", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 3
xtreg Maid USinfluence W wideo wint usexpor $cont i.year ///
if region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4a", tex append $outr
*** LAC
** Column 4
xtreg Maid USinfluence W wideo wint usexpor $cont i.year ///
if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table4a", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
******************Table 5: Guerrillas & Civil War & Reagan
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 1
xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W wideo wint Guerilla reagan ///
$cont i.year if region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5a", tex replace $outr
*** LAC
** Column 2
xtreg lnMaid USinfluence W wideo wint Guerilla reagan ///
$cont i.year if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5a", tex append $outr
***** Probability of receiving aid
*** REST OF THE WORLD
** Column 3
xtreg Maid USinfluence W wideo wint Guerilla reagan ///
$cont i.year if region!="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5a", tex append $outr
*** LAC
** Column 4
xtreg Maid USinfluence W wideo wint Guerilla reagan ///
$cont i.year if region=="LAC", fe $clus
outreg2 using "$td/table5a", tex append $outr
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fvset base 2 cty
global cont1 "eS RB RB2 lnPOP tau LlnTRADE Lciv"
*** Heckman Sample Selection Model
heckman lnEaid USinfluence W $cont1 wideo wint x1 x2 x3 ///
x4 x5 i.cty i.year if region!="LAC", select(Eaid = ///
USinfluence $cont1 W wideo wint USworld RA x1 x2 x3 x4 ///
x5 i.cty i.year) two
outreg2 using "$td/table6", tex replace $outr
heckman lnEaid USinfluence W $cont1 wideo wint x1 x2 x3 ///
x4 x5 i.cty i.year if region=="LAC", select(Eaid = ///
USinfluence $cont1 W wideo wint USworld RA x1 x2 x3 x4 ///
x5 i.cty i.year) two
outreg2 using "$td/table6", tex append $outr
****************************************************************
**** Newey-West robust standard errors (30 lags)
** Main specification
xi: newey2 lnEaid USinfluence W wideo wint $cont ///
RUSinfluence new_leader_dum year_in_office i.cty if ///
region!="LAC", lag(30) i(obs) t(year) force
outreg2 using "$td/newey_bsc",tex replace $outr
xi: newey2 lnEaid USinfluence W wideo wint $cont ///
RUSinfluence new_leader_dum year_in_office i.cty if ///
region=="LAC", lag(30) i(obs) t(year) force
outreg2 using "$td/newey_bsc",tex append $outr
** Including US exports
xi: newey2 lnEaid USinfluence W wideo wint usexpor $cont ///
RUSinfluence new_leader_dum year_in_office i.cty if ///
region!="LAC", lag(30) i(obs) t(year) force
outreg2 using "$td/newey_bsc",tex append $outr
xi: newey2 lnEaid USinfluence W wideo wint usexpor $cont ///
RUSinfluence new_leader_dum year_in_office i.cty if ///
region=="LAC", lag(30) i(obs) t(year) force
outreg2 using "$td/newey_bsc",tex append l$outr
************************************************
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***********************************************/*
Elaborated by Eugenia Suarez as part of my dissertation project
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This do-file presents the results of the paper "CSR and
the Economy"
OUTCOME TABLES: Table1-Table6.tex
Table8.tex & tablelog.tex (attitudes)
FIGURES: concave.png (concavity)
SOURCES:
KLD
COMPUSTAT
Both available at: https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/)
ANES (http://www.electionstudies.org/)
************************************************
************************************************/
version 13.1
clear all
drop _all
set linesize 255
set mem 5000M
set more off, permanently
do "/Users/eugenia/Dropbox/PHD1/CSR/stata/do2/00_run_first.do"
set matsize 3000
use $dd/csr.dta, clear
set more off, perm
xtdes
macro drop control
global control "emp roaemp hhi lnrd lnxad"
global control_lag "lemp lroaemp llnrd llnxad"
global cli "cluster(industry)"
global cls "cluster(state)"
sutex act ebit roa emp roaemp hhi lnrd lnxad laggdp_ind ///
mgays munions menviron mbusiness pfirmscsr
xtserial csr laggdp_ind $control
****************************************************************
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******************* Table 2. CSR and Growth results ************
****************************************************************
**** Column 1:
xtreg csr laggdp_ind $control year, fe robust $cli
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex replace nolabel less(1)
**** Column 2:
xtlogit csr laggdp_ind $control year, fe
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append nolabel less(1)
**** Column 3:
xtregar csr laggdp_ind $control, fe
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append nolabel less(1)
**** Column 4:
xtARGLS csr laggdp_ind $control year if maxt>3 & maxNind>3, ///
groupvar(id) timevar(year) ar(1) ttrendvars(st_16 st_36) $cli
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append nolabel less(1)
**** Column 5:
xtscc csr laggdp_ind $control year, fe
outreg2 using $td/table2, tex append nolabel less(1)
****************************************************************
**************** Table 3. Gazelles vs Elephants ****************
****************************************************************
** Heterogeneous effects
sum roa, det
gen gazelle=.
replace gazelle=0 if roa<r(p75)
replace gazelle=1 if roa>=r(p75) & roa!=.
**** Column 1: Elephant
xtreg csr laggdp_ind $control year if gazelle==0, fe robust $cli
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex replace nolabel less(1)
**** Column 2: Gazelle
xtreg csr laggdp_ind $control year if gazelle==1, fe robust $cli
outreg2 using $td/table3, tex append nolabel less(1)
****************************************************************
****************** Table 4. Dcsr Mlogit ************************
****************************************************************
**** Column 1 & 2: Mlogit with cluster by industry
mlogit Dcsr laggdp_ind $control if past==1, cluster(industry)
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est store mlogitcluster
margins, dydx(*) predict(outcome(1))atmeans post
est store eq3
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex replace nolabel less(1)
est restore mlogitcluster
margins, dydx(*) predict(outcome(-1))atmeans post
est store eq4
outreg2 using $td/table4, tex append nolabel less(1)
****************************************************************
********************* Table for Annex **************************
****************************************************************
** Table 5:
**** Column 1: FE without AR process
xtreg Dcsr laggdp_ind $control year, fe robust $cli
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex replace nolabel less(1)
**** Column 2: FE without AR process and with sector dummies
xtregar Dcsr laggdp_ind $control, fe
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append nolabel less(1)
**** Column 3: FE with AR (1) and cluster by sector
xtARGLS Dcsr laggdp_ind $control year if maxt>3 & maxNind>3, ///
groupvar(id) timevar(year) ar(1) ttrendvars(st_16 st_36) $cli
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append nolabel less(1)
**** Column 4: FE allowing spatial correlation
xtscc Dcsr laggdp_ind $control year, fe
outreg2 using $td/table5, tex append nolabel less(1)
****************************************************************
************************* Peer effects *************************
****************************************************************
** Graph
*Aux regressions for graph (get breaking points)
xtreg Dcsr pfirmscsr pf2
xtreg Dcsr pfirmscsr pf2 $control, robust $cli
preserve
* For graph use concave.dta and
use $dd/Concave2.dta, clear
twoway ||scatter y x, xline(0.769, lcol(navy)) ///
xtitle("Percentage of firms") yaxis(1)|| ||scatter y2 x2, ///
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xline(0.792, lcolor(red)) yaxis(2)||, legend(rows(1) ///
lab(1 "Bivariate") lab(2 "With Controls"))
graph export "$gd/Concave2.png", replace
restore
merge m:m year industry using $dd/csr.dta
** Table 6:
** Column 1
xi: xtreg csr pfirmscsr pf2 laggdp_ind $control ran, fe robust $cli
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex replace nolabel less(1)
** Column 2
xtreg Dcsr pfirmscsr pf2 $control ran, fe robust $cli
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append nolabel less(1)
** Column 3
xtreg intensity pfirmscsr pf2 $control ran, fe robust $cli
outreg2 using $td/table6, tex append nolabel less(1)
****************************************************************
********************** Consumer attitudes *********************
****************************************************************
/* Table 8: Probability that consumer attitudes could affect
the decision of doing CSR (LPM) */
** Column 1
xtreg div_str mgays $control i.year, fe robust $cls
outreg2 using $td/table8, tex replace nolabel less(1)
** Column 2
xtreg emp_str munions $control i.year, fe robust $cls
outreg2 using $td/table8, tex append nolabel less(1)
** Column 3
xtreg env_str menviron $control i.year, fe robust $cls
outreg2 using $td/table8, tex append nolabel less(1)
/* Table log: Probability that consumer attitudes could affect
the decision of doing CSR (logit) */
logit div_str mg $control i.year, robust $cls
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using $td/tablelog, tex replace nolabel less(1)
logit emp_str mu $control i.year, robust $cls
margins, dydx(*) post
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outreg2 using $td/tablelog, tex append nolabel less(1)
logit env_str me $control i.year, robust $cls
margins, dydx(*) post
outreg2 using $td/tablelog, tex append nolabel less(1)
